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As partners in the European capacity‐building project NanoCap, trade unions and environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have established positions on the development of nanotechnologies. Key in their positioning is their view that the use of nanomaterials with currently unknown occupational and environmental hazards must have consequences for the risk management and use of nanoproducts. They have made proposals for responsible manufacturing and for applying the precautionary principle to the use of nanoproducts and they urgently call for the acceptance and the operationalization of a precautionary approach by the industry and governments. The trade unions and NGOs are calling for transparency and openness regarding processes and products that contain nanomaterials and have proposed specific tools for nanomaterial use that put the precautionary principle into practice, including the principles no data → no exposure and no data → no emission. The proposed tools also include compulsory reporting of the type and content of nanoparticles applied in products, a register of workers possibly exposed to nanoparticles, and the use of nano reference values as guides to assess workplace exposure to nanoparticles.

This paper deals with substitution of hazardous substances in production processes for environmental and health and safety reasons, with special reference to experiences of substitution of volatile organic compounds in paints and in concrete mould release agents. Substitution in this context is seen as a particular kind of technological transfer, in which the main value of the technology lies in its environmental and health and safety performances, as a contribution to industrial sustainability. The authors identify the main actors of the substitution process (industry, trade unions, NGOs, etc.), the role they play in such a process (promoter, target group, ally or opposer) and the scene in which the action develops (i.e. the institutional and cultural framework). Building on the lessons and experiences drawn from the analysis of twenty cases in different sectors throughout the European Union, factors favouring and opposing substitution, as well as the features of "good" promoters and projects, are analysed.