Search results

Annotation Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country.The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success.Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare.Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy

Examines roots of the Holocaust and its current memorialization and interrelationship between history, memory, and public policy.

In this timely collection, a dozen leading scholars of international affairs consider the twentieth century's recurring failure to construct a stable and peaceful international order in the wake of war. Why has peace been so hard to build? The authors reflect on the difficulties faced by governments as they sought a secure world order after the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War.Major wars unleashed new and unexpected forces, the authors show, and in post-war periods policymakers were faced not only with the reappearance of old power-political issues but also with quite unforeseen challenges. In 1918, a hundred-year-old order based on a balance of power among the states of Europe collapsed, leaving European and American leaders to deal with social, ideological, and ethnic crises. After World War II, hopeful plans for peace were checked by nuclear rivalry, international economic competition, and colonial issues. And unexpected challenges after the Cold War-global economic instability, ethnic conflict, environmental crises-joined with traditional security threats to cast a pall again over international peace efforts. In drawing out historical parallels and comparing how major states have adapted to sharp and sudden changes in the international system during the twentieth century, this book offers essential insights for those who hope to navigate toward peace across today's altered and uncertain strategic landscape.Contributors to this volume:Carole Fink, Gregory Flynn, William I. Hitchcock, Michael Howard, Paul Kennedy, Diane B. Kunz, Melvyn P. Leffler, Charles S. Maier, Tony Smith, Marc Trachtenberg, Randall B. Woods, Philip Zelikow