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Institution system is an important part of modern social governance. Government, market and social relations within the system, as well as the corresponding institutional arrangements, can be said to be the top priority. Corporate social responsibility is an outstanding case that embodies the relationship and institutional arrangement of the three in practice. Government regulation of social credit system is a good example to analysis it. The research on government regulation of social credit system itself is put forward from the perspective of government, so in the field of government regulation of social credit system, should enterprises play a role? Especially in the era of big data, a large number of data are provided by private enterprises. Without these data, it is difficult to complete the construction of big data system. If enterprises should play their role, what's the contribution of the government? Academic and industrial circles have been expressing their own opinions on these issues. Therefore, this paper attempts to build a game model among government, enterprise and society to solve the following problems: how to solve the relationship problem among government, enterprise and society? How to build the corresponding system? What's the corresponding government regulation of China's social credit system go from the perspective of business ethics? Through the game model analysis, the author finds that shareholders can reduce the threat of CEO replacement and collude with the management staff members to make the cake (including the interests of stakeholders) smaller. But on the basis of the loss of stakeholders' rights and interests, shareholders' wealth is increasing, which also explains why more and more senior executives are trying to form collusion with stakeholders in the campaign against antitakeover and loose audit system. Shareholders' rights and interests and stakeholders' rights and interests present a seesaw phenomenon. The response of the stakeholders and shareholders to a better corporate governance model is consistent. That is to say, the increase of shareholders' income is not necessarily based on the loss of stakeholders. The game model also shows that the protection of formal laws and regulations is the main factor to increase the benefits of stakeholders. Through the case of the social credit system, we will conclude that the formal laws and regulations cannot fully ensure the increase of stakeholders' income, but also need to strengthen the transformation of institutional advantages into governance advantages, and strengthen the law enforcement. It will finally promote the further improvement of social credit system.

The taxonomy of the genus Coptotermes is far from settled in the world, especially in China. Coptotermes formosanus Shiraki had been described or misidentified as several different species in China based on measurement characteristics. In this paper, the synonyms of C. formosanus from China are listed, and it is proposed that C. guizhouensis is a new junior synonym of C. formosanus.

Seventeen polymorphic microsatellite DNA loci for Copototermes formosanus were isolated and characterized. Polymorphism of these loci was assessed in a sample of 32 unrelated C. formosanus individuals. An average of 4.6 alleles per locus (3-8 alleles) was detected. Observed and expected heterozygosities ranged from 0.2500 to 1.0000 and from 0.5591 to 0.8562, respectively. Six loci were found to have deviated from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium in the sampled population after Bonferroni correction. No significant linkage disequilibrium was detected. These markers will be useful in population genetics, phylogenies and other relevant studies of C. formosanus.

AbstractThis study aims to investigate the relationship between partner selection and new service development (NSD) success. We identified three partner selection factors based on partner selection theory: partner reliability, partner expertise, and partner compatibility, and suggested product‐market experience and technological experience as moderators. We developed a questionnaire and distributed it to 446 financial service companies in Taiwan. Overall, we received 122 usable pairs of responses from each firm's sales manager and marketing manager. The results indicate that interorganizational coordination contributes to NSD success. Among the three partner selection factors, partner reliability and partner compatibility were found to positively affect interorganizational coordination. In addition, product‐market experience enhances the positive effect of interorganizational coordination on NSD success. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Portrayals of China's bureaucratic behavior tend to emphasize either streamlined central control via top‐down directives emanating from a Leninist system, or a highly fragmented organization characterized by continuous horizontal bargaining. While both views have merit, they miss important but little‐recognized dynamics of Chinese bureaucratic behavior. Examination of the 30‐year evolution of a single organization, China's 863 Program, allows us a unique look inside the "black box" of decision making. First, we highlight a largely unrecognized mechanism of top‐down control: a signal‐response process that fosters substantial uncertainty for officials in the system. Second, our case highlights a circumstance in which reformers made radical moves—deployed as a "band‐aid" layer of rational‐instrumentalism—to meet a perceived external security threat. These moves demonstrate efforts to incorporate Weberian norms, and suggest sources of dynamism and learning in a "hybrid adaptive" bureaucracy.