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AbstractObjectiveMany welfare states in young democracies feature low effective social insurance coverage, especially in old‐age pension. What explains the ineffective coverage? This article shows individual income instability is a microlevel factor contributing to low effective coverage.MethodThe article used 15 waves of the Korean Labor Income Panel Study and constructed a fine‐grained individual‐level income instability measure, which was used to predict individual participation in state‐run public pension using (multinomial) logistic models with industry, occupation, and cohort fixed effects.ResultThe article shows that income instability is negatively associated with public pension participation, and the negative relationship becomes larger as income level increases. Moreover, income instability inhibits only participation in state‐led risk pooling, but not in private self‐insuring.ConclusionThe article sheds light on disentangling an individual‐level factor buttressing young welfare states and bears implications for the future contour of welfare states in young democracies.

AbstractThis article examines the reasons behind Taiwan's effective COVID‐19 response. While some have argued that Taiwan's success with COVID‐19 is based on its experience with SARS, I argue that we should not attribute Taiwan's effective response solely to its SARS experience. The country's success mainly lies in three factors: (1) reliance on the mask policy as the main disease prevention measure and the ability to quickly expand mask production capacity; (2) use of big data and technology to enhance effective implementation of disease prevention and detection measures; and (3) strong state‐society relations favoring transparency, communication, and collaboration. The first two factors can trace their roots to the country's developmental state model. Democracy provides the institutional underpinning for a vibrant civil society and the synergy between state and civil society, strengthening Taiwan's crisis governance legitimacy and increasing citizens' voluntary compliance.

Abstract
Racial disparities have persisted in COVID-19 infection, hospitalization, and death rates in the United States. Differences in vaccination hesitancy have also emerged by race: communities of color and, particularly, African Americans have been more reluctant to get a vaccine to prevent COVID-19. Can racial descriptive norms provide a tool to increase confidence and reduce hesitancy within the US public? We conducted a survey experiment at the end of January 2021 on a sample of non-Hispanic white and Black American adults. The experiment varied whether information about uptake intent by race was provided, and what racial group was reported to be more likely to get a vaccine if one were available to them today. Our results show that the tendency to conform to one's racial ingroup can play a key role in improving vaccination attitudes across race. Indeed, whites become significantly more willing to get vaccinated now or in the near future after they learn that a majority of whites intend to do so. Furthermore, both Blacks with high science trust and whites with low science trust are more likely to accept multiple vaccine doses and yearly boosters if their racial ingroup plans on getting vaccinated. Finally, the desire for ingroup conformity leads Blacks with low science trust to be more willing to receive a vaccine when they are provided a choice among vaccine brands.

Why do individuals in democratic societies voluntarily request and support stringent policies? What factors contribute to variations in support for different restrictive measures among citizens? This study examines the micro-level impact of the securitisation narrative on individuals' voluntary support for stringent policies within a democratic context, using the narrative policy framework. Based on evidence from a conjoint experiment conducted in Taiwan, the study finds that agreeing with the narrative 'COVID-19 is a national security threat' does not translate into support for all types of restrictive measures. The contents of the securitisation narrative matter significantly; individuals who are more persuaded by the narratives are more likely to support border containment measures and mask mandates because of how narrative contents were structured. These findings highlight the importance for researchers and policymakers to carefully consider policy narrative contents to effectively communicate and garner support for a range of policies during times of crisis.

Abstract
This report collects all the keywords that have appeared in the International Journal of Taiwan Studies since its first issue in February 2018. The authors use these keywords and resulting word clouds to reflect on the current state of Taiwan-related research. We find that publications are still heavily dominated by cross-Strait-related topics and that, despite the aspiration of putting Taiwan in a comparative perspective, the results have so far been relatively limited. We suggest including more topical sections in future issues as one way to diversify the interdisciplinary and comparative scope of the journal.

AbstractOne year after the World Health Organization declared COVID‐19 a global pandemic, governments around the world adopt similar practices in containing the COVID‐19 spread. Nevertheless, variation exists in the level of policy compliance, which directly contribute to policy success/failure across countries. As the pandemic continues, pandemic fatigue also decreases the public's willingness to comply. Increasing policy compliance during the remainder of pandemic has become a transnational concern. Using Taiwan's quarantine policy as an example, this article illustrates three aspects to craft an effective compliance regime to fight public health crises like COVID‐19: (1) a comprehensive policy mix to reduce heterogeneous compliance barriers that impact different social groups; (2) constant and various policy communication with heterogeneous target audiences; and (3) leveraging and integrating street‐level bureaucrats in the policy implementation stages. Taiwan's case provides several policy lessons for other countries: compliance regime is not driven by top‐down enforcement but through the integration of policy design and implementation that remove all barriers for compliance. Taiwan's street level bureaucrats are the glue of the compliance regime. This article bears policy implications for policy makers around the world when aiming for increasing policy compliance.

The Sunflower Movement—an occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the Congress) for 24 days—was an unprecedented moment in the history of Taiwan. We examine the social foundation of the Movement and explore an important factor that has long been missing in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. We divide nationalism into three dimensions: national attachment, national chauvinism, and feelings toward other countries. Using original survey data collected six months after the Movement, we find that national attachment (being proud of Taiwan) and anti-China feelings are unique dimensions and both lead to a higher level of support for the Sunflower Movement. National chauvinism, on the other hand, is not associated with supports for the Movement. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. The underlying logic is when people are more nationalistic they care more about the potential social impact of expanding socio-economic exchanges with another country. These results point to it being necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals' political behaviors.

Facemasks have been proven an effective non-pharmaceutical measure against coronavirus disease-19. Against the backdrop of global mask shortages, Taiwan distinguished herself from other countries in that Taiwan took a whole-of-nation approach to masks and mobilized the society quickly to become self-sufficient in masks. This paper argues that successful virus securitization as a threat to national security was what enabled Taiwan to effectively mobilize the private sector to carry out the state's will in ensuring adequate mask supply. Moreover, Taiwan securitized the virus more successfully than many other countries because the virus was connected to China, the nation's existing security threat.

AbstractPreexisting political institutions influence governments' responses to public health crises in different ways, creating national variations. This article investigates how state capacity, a country's fundamental ability to organize bureaucracy and allocate societal resources, affects the timing and configuration of governments' COVID‐19 policy responses. Through comparative case study analysis of five of China's neighboring countries early in the COVID‐19 crisis, the paper shows that more‐capable states (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) initiated crisis response faster, mobilized national resources more extensively, and utilized diverse policy tools when the virus risk level was still low. In contrast, low‐capacity states (Thailand and Indonesia) were more reactive in handling the crisis, limited their focus to border‐related measures, and were more constrained in the types of tools they could employ. The paper points to the importance of studying the COVID‐19 response process rather than the outcome (i.e., confirmed cases/deaths) when unpacking the impacts of political institutions in public health crises.

Preexisting political institutions influence governments' responses to public health crises in different ways, creating national variations. This article investigates how state capacity, a country's fundamental ability to organize bureaucracy and allocate societal resources, affects the timing and configuration of governments' COVID‐19 policy responses. Through comparative case study analysis of five of China's neighboring countries early in the COVID‐19 crisis, the paper shows that more‐capable states (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) initiated crisis response faster, mobilized national resources more extensively, and utilized diverse policy tools when the virus risk level was still low. In contrast, low‐capacity states (Thailand and Indonesia) were more reactive in handling the crisis, limited their focus to border‐related measures, and were more constrained in the types of tools they could employ. The paper points to the importance of studying the COVID‐19 response process rather than the outcome (i.e., confirmed cases/deaths) when unpacking the impacts of political institutions in public health crises.