Search results

Conventional wisdom holds that violent protests alienate the public. But violence could also create tactical disagreement among protesters and weaken their unity. So, to what extent does protesters' use of violence erode intra-movement cohesion? This article argues that protesters can preserve cohesion by falsifying their private moral preferences and restraining themselves from public denunciation, an act which I characterize as 'tolerant solidarity'. Based on a survey experiment on participants of Hong Kong's 2019 protests, I examine how their private and public preferences toward violence change in response to three divisive conditions: protesters taking the initiative, violence causing physical harm, and violence targeting counter-protesters. Results show while these divisive conditions make respondents more likely to morally disapprove violence, the effects are weaker in their support for public denunciation, an indication that their private preferences are partially concealed. Findings contribute to the study of contentious politics by advancing a more complex understanding of movement cohesion when protester violence is involved.

AbstractCountermobilization has been a common strategy for autocrats to counteract the threat of opposition. Although the use of countermobilization has drawn scholarly attention, research on the mechanisms that enable countermobilization remains limited. This article underscores the role of political institutions in allowing autocrats to carry out countermobilization through incentivizing elites to serve as a bridge between the state and the masses. Focusing on the case of Hong Kong, where pro-government countermobilization is rising along with pro-democracy challenges against the hybrid regime, the article argues that countermobilization is enabled because societal elites are incentivized through political institutions to organize the masses and develop mobilization capacity through grassroots organizations. Using original elite biographical data and organizational data, the article shows that elites with more ties with grassroots organizations are more likely to remain in office in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The findings offer an institutionalist explanation of how authoritarian rulers enact countermobilization by leveraging elite intermediaries and their grassroots networks. In this light, political institutions can serve as a conduit for the state to extend social control.

The rise of government procurement has transformed the associational landscape in China. In many localities, local states have launched procurement programs to collaborate with NGOs, which in turn provide social services to community residents. While it has been argued that government funding shapes NGOs into compliant service providers, this article contends that state-funded NGOs are able to engage in advocacy through service delivery, a strategy known as 'service activism'. By examining three NGOs in Guangdong Province, this article argues that NGOs' success in service activism is determined by their degree of institutional embeddedness in the local state and the nature of their advocacy strategies. While both strongly or weakly embedded relationships can weaken the impact of advocacy, progressive strategies in sensitive issue areas can weaken collaboration and draw repression. (J Contemp China/GIGA)