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There is a commitment in Thomas Hobbes's work which is largely neglected by sociology, a commitment to society as a product of sovereignty. Hobbes makes this commitment in line with his strident opposition to the scholastic idea of the dominance of reason in nature. For Hobbes, society is not based on natural reason. Drawing on his distinctive Epicurean anthropology, he argues that the small amount of reason that nature supplies to humans is enough to give them a limited capacity for sociability – enough, that is, to achieve a rudimentary level of self-preservation – but not nearly enough to produce society. He builds this argument directly against the scholastic argument that nature in fact supplies to humans so much reason that, were they to apply it in the manner in which nature intends, they would achieve a perfect society. In forging his particular direction against the scholastics, Hobbes draws mostly on his Epicurean political philosophy, whereby the rule of a strong authority, the sovereign, disciplines the wills of subjects in order to properly balance their passions, to the extent that a distinct domain of peace and security is created and maintained, a domain he mostly calls simply 'society'. His account of society is normative in only one respect, a very important respect – its dedication to the fundamental importance of peace and security.

This article is not so much concerned with the history of cultural studies as with the way in which aspects of its history are used in forming a particular type of cultural studies intellectual, one for whom ethics is subsumed into a morality directed to the necessity of engaging in a politics of empowerment. The article's concern, this is to say, is to problematise the taken-for-grantedness of this type of intellectual, something it seeks to do through a genealogy (in something like the Foucaultian sense of that term), or at least the outline of a genealogy.

The recent collection Sociological Objects: Reconfigurations of Social Theory provides plenty of evidence in support of the proposition that there is not a strong mood within sociology today to conduct an ongoing productive debate about 'society' as the core object of the discipline, in the way that, for example, economics conducts such a debate about 'the economy'. Instead, sociology is much more likely to have disparate debates, each organized around a different object or candidate-object. That is, most debates within the discipline about what is, are, or should be its object or objects are conducted by advocates of some theoretical trend or other which these advocates think more important than other trends, and certainly more important than the object society. This situation is far from conducive to increased public relevance, especially because, in most cases, the target audience of each debate is a cohort of insiders. If the discipline were to more strenuously organize and/or participate in public debates about society it would at very least find itself associated with a notion which has currency beyond the field itself, such that even if sociologists were to debate society using technical language they might still attract wide public attention, in the way that economics attracts such attention when it debates technical aspects of the economy, like monetary policy or 'irrational exuberance' or the technicalities of the derivatives behind the global financial crisis. Using Sociological Objects as a launching pad, this paper explores the decline within sociology of the object society and shows how easily the lessons offered by historical insights can be undermined by a particular attitude toward the use of theory.

After suggesting that Stephen Turner's work is characterized by a determination to offer viable alternatives to blockages generated by adherence to dogmas, particularly those generated by adherence to Kantian metaphysics, this review article concentrates on his recent book Explaining the Normative. The article sets out the book's descriptions of a wide variety of positions, 'each of which accounts for a different kind of normativity'. Perhaps the only common feature of these positions is the idea of 'the necessity or indispensability of the normative'. Turner challenges the normativists' certainty, employing a range of argumentative strategies which add up to the project of explaining the normative. The article seeks to show how Turner goes about this project and to show that he succeeds in his quest to undermine the normativists' claim that the normative itself cannot be explained. Ultimately, Turner is able to say to them, politely but firmly, 'Yes it can'.

Focusing on Foucault's distinction between an older, superseded model — the juridical/sovereignty model — and a newer one — which he refers to by a variety of names, such as disciplinary bio-power, art of government and governmentality — this article seeks, first, to demonstrate that his account of modern positive power is an unsatisfactory explanation of this type of power. It does this by contrasting it with an account that locates modern positive power in a set of early modern limiting mechanisms, mechanisms that actually produced the modern limited domain of the social, the principal object of sociology, initially only as a domain of respite from raging religious violence. On the back of this argument, the article also seeks to show that Foucault's account is politically problematic, in two ways: one, that it is rooted in a tradition of unengaged `critique' and, two, that it is tied, albeit inadvertently, to totalitarianism.

If it is to become a more widely used resource at the present time, when the demand is growing for explanations of the predicament of modern western society in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 and various similar subsequent events around the globe, classical sociology might pay more attention than it usually does to a particular set of early modern developments. These developments, it is argued here, actually created the form of the social that became large-scale modern western society. This new form of the social was and remains distinct from those older forms that were seen to flow from the natural sociality of human beings. Between the middle of the 16th century and the end of the 17th the new form of the social emerged in different parts of Europe, contingently but not entirely accidentally, as a separate domain of relatively safe and free human interaction. It was a consequence — in part intended, in part unintended — of different bids to secure civil peace in times of extreme inter-communal, inter-confessional violence. These bids included, to name just three measures: the development of new forms of public law, especially in Germany; the development of the absolutist state, especially in France; and the separation of private religious conscience from public legal conscience, especially in England. As they were all, in one way or another, steps towards stemming, stopping, and/or preventing the flow of blood caused by religious hatreds, they are here called early modern limiting measures, and the social at the centre of the article is sometimes called the limited social or limited society.