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Objective The objective was to demonstrate anthropomorphism needs to communicate contextually useful information to increase user confidence and accurately calibrate human trust in automation. Background Anthropomorphism is believed to improve human-automation trust but supporting evidence remains equivocal. We test the Human-Automation Trust Expectation Model (HATEM) that predicts improvements to trust calibration and confidence in accepted advice arising from anthropomorphism will be weak unless it aids naturalistic communication of contextually useful information to facilitate prediction of automation failures. Method Ninety-eight undergraduates used a submarine periscope simulator to classify ships, aided by the Ship Automated Modelling (SAM) system that was 50% reliable. A between-subjects 2 × 3 design compared SAM appearance (anthropomorphic avatar vs. camera eye) and voice inflection (monotone vs. meaningless vs. meaningful), with the meaningful inflections communicating contextually useful information about automated advice regarding certainty and uncertainty. Results Avatar SAM appearance was rated as more anthropomorphic than camera eye, and meaningless and meaningful inflections were both rated more anthropomorphic than monotone. However, for subjective trust, trust calibration, and confidence in accepting SAM advice, there was no evidence of anthropomorphic appearance having any impact, while there was decisive evidence that meaningful inflections yielded better outcomes on these trust measures than monotone and meaningless inflections. Conclusion Anthropomorphism had negligible impact on human-automation trust unless its execution enhanced communication of relevant information that allowed participants to better calibrate expectations of automation performance. Application Designers using anthropomorphism to calibrate trust need to consider what contextually useful information will be communicated via anthropomorphic features.

Objective To examine the effects of action recommendation and action implementation automation on performance, workload, situation awareness (SA), detection of automation failure, and return-to-manual performance in a submarine track management task. Background Theory and meta-analytic evidence suggest that with increasing degrees of automation (DOA), operator performance improves and workload decreases, but SA and return-to-manual performance declines. Method Participants monitored the location and heading of contacts in order to classify them, mark their closest point of approach (CPA), and dive when necessary. Participants were assigned either no automation, action recommendation automation, or action implementation automation. An automation failure occurred late in the task, whereby the automation provided incorrect classification advice or implemented incorrect classification actions. Results Compared to no automation, action recommendation automation benefited automated task performance and lowered workload, but cost nonautomated task performance. Action implementation automation resulted in perfect automated task performance (by default) and lowered workload, with no costs to nonautomated task performance, SA, or return-to-manual performance compared to no automation. However, participants provided action implementation automation were less likely to detect the automation failure compared to those provided action recommendations, and made less accurate classifications immediately after the automation failure, compared to those provided no automation. Conclusion Action implementation automation produced the anticipated benefits but also caused poorer automation failure detection. Application While action implementation automation may be effective for some task contexts, system designers should be aware that operators may be less likely to detect automation failures and that performance may suffer until such failures are detected.

Objective To examine the effects of interruptions and retention interval on prospective memory for deferred tasks in simulated air traffic control. Background In many safety-critical environments, operators need to remember to perform a deferred task, which requires prospective memory. Laboratory experiments suggest that extended prospective memory retention intervals, and interruptions in those retention intervals, could impair prospective memory performance. Method Participants managed a simulated air traffic control sector. Participants were sometimes instructed to perform a deferred handoff task, requiring them to deviate from a routine procedure. We manipulated whether an interruption occurred during the prospective memory retention interval or not, the length of the retention interval (37–117 s), and the temporal proximity of the interruption to deferred task encoding and execution. We also measured performance on ongoing tasks. Results Increasing retention intervals (37–117 s) decreased the probability of remembering to perform the deferred task. Costs to ongoing conflict detection accuracy and routine handoff speed were observed when a prospective memory intention had to be maintained. Interruptions did not affect individuals' speed or accuracy on the deferred task. Conclusion Longer retention intervals increase risk of prospective memory error and of ongoing task performance being impaired by cognitive load; however, prospective memory can be robust to effects of interruptions when the task environment provides cuing and offloading. Application To support operators in performing complex and dynamic tasks, prospective memory demands should be reduced, and the retention interval of deferred tasks should be kept as short as possible.

Objective The objective of this study is to examine the effects of low and high degree of automation (DOA) on performance, subjective workload, situation awareness (SA), and return-to-manual control in simulated submarine track management. Background Theory and meta-analytic evidence suggest that as DOA increases, operator performance improves and workload decreases, but SA and return-to-manual control declines. Research also suggests that operators have particular difficulty regaining manual control if automation provides incorrect advice. Method Undergraduate student participants completed a submarine track management task that required them to track the position and behavior of contacts. Low DOA supported information acquisition and analysis, whereas high DOA recommended decisions. At a late stage in the task, automation was either unexpectedly removed or provided incorrect advice. Results Relative to no automation, low DOA moderately benefited performance but impaired SA and non-automated task performance. Relative to no automation and low DOA, high DOA benefited performance and lowered workload. High DOA did impair non-automated task performance compared with no automation, but this was equivalent to low DOA. Participants were able to return-to-manual control when they knew low or high DOA was disengaged, or when high DOA provided incorrect advice. Conclusion High DOA improved performance and lowered workload, at no additional cost to SA or return-to-manual performance when compared with low DOA. Application Designers should consider the likely level of uncertainty in the environment and the consequences of return-to-manual deficits before implementing low or high DOA.

Objective Examine the extent to which increasing information integration across displays in a simulated submarine command and control room can reduce operator workload, improve operator situation awareness, and improve team performance. Background In control rooms, the volume and number of sources of information are increasing, with the potential to overwhelm operator cognitive capacity. It is proposed that by distributing information to maximize relevance to each operator role (increasing information integration), it is possible to not only reduce operator workload but also improve situation awareness and team performance. Method Sixteen teams of six novice participants were trained to work together to combine data from multiple sensor displays to build a tactical picture of surrounding contacts at sea. The extent that data from one display were available to operators at other displays was manipulated (information integration) between teams. Team performance was assessed as the accuracy of the generated tactical picture. Results Teams built a more accurate tactical picture, and individual team members had better situation awareness and lower workload, when provided with high compared with low information integration. Conclusion A human-centered design approach to integrating information in command and control settings can result in lower workload, and enhanced situation awareness and team performance. Application The design of modern command and control rooms, in which operators must fuse increasing volumes of complex data from displays, may benefit from higher information integration based on a human-centered design philosophy, and a fundamental understanding of the cognitive work that is carried out by operators.

Objective: Examine the extent to which subjective workload and situation awareness (SA) can predict variance in performance at the between- and within-person levels of analysis in a simulated submarine track management task. Background: SA and workload are crucial constructs in human factors that are conceptualized as states that change within individuals over time. Thus, a change in an individual's subjective workload or SA over the course of performing a task should be predictive of their subsequent performance (within-person effects). However, there is little empirical evidence for this. Method: Participants monitored displays to track the behaviors of contacts in relationship to their own ship (Ownship) and landmarks. The Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique measured SA, and the Air Traffic Workload Input Technique measured subjective workload. Results: When a participant's subjective workload rating increased, their subsequent performance decreased, but there was no evidence for within-person effects of SA on performance. We replicated prior between-person level effects of SA; participants with higher SA performed better than those with lower SA. Conclusion: Change in an individual's subjective workload rating (but not SA) was predictive of their subsequent performance. Because an increase in SA should increase the extent to which operators hold the knowledge required to perform subsequent tasks, further research is required to examine SA effects on performance at the within-person level. Application: Adapting automation is more likely to produce optimal outcomes if based on measurement of operator states that predict future task performance, such as workload.