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This paper presents time-varying contagion indices of credit risk spillover and feedback between 64 financials and sovereigns in the euro area, where spillover is identified based on bilateral Granger causality regressions. Over-identification of contagion between financials' true credit risk and sovereign credit risk is avoided 1) by controlling for common factors; 2) by relying on fair value CDS spreads as the credit risk measure for financials. The results show that in particular the run-up to the financial crisis and the more intense phases of the crisis were associated with credit risk contagion and feedback. The institutions identified as most central to the network during those episodes are known to have played important roles during the crisis. Furthermore, the tense periods were short-lived and sovereign-to-bank spillover is found to normalise when policy makers took measures to stem the crisis. Finally, a proxy for the value of implicit government guarantees to the financial sector was still positive towards the end of the sample, suggesting the financial-sovereign nexus had not been removed yet by new bank resolution mechanisms and regulatory changes.

Policy impact studies often suffer from endogeneity problems. Consider the case of the ECB Securities Markets Programme: If Eurosystem interventions were triggered by sudden and strong price deteriorations, looking at daily price changes may bias downwards the correlation between yields and the amounts of bonds purchased. Simple regression of daily changes in yields on quantities often give insignificant or even positive coefficients and therefore suggest that SMP interventions have been ineffective, or worse counterproductive. We use high frequency data on purchases of the ECB Securities Markets Programme and sovereign bond quotes to address the endogeneity issues. We propose an econometric model that considers, simultaneously, first and second conditional moments of market price returns at daily and intradaily frequency. We find that SMP interventions succeeded in reducing yields and volatility of government bond segments of the countries under the programme. Finally, the new econometric model is broadly applicable to market intervention studies.

This paper analyses the main drivers of the ECB's balance sheet and profit and loss account over the first 11 years of the ECB's existence. Furthermore, the paper assesses the financial strength of the ECB. As monetary policy operations are normally conducted by national central banks under the impulse and instructions from the ECB, the Eurosystem balance sheet is the primary reference for the analysis of Eurosystem monetary policy operations. Three main drivers of the balance sheet and profit and loss account are identified. Firstly, financial market developments and portfolio management decisions imply changes in the value of the foreign reserve and own funds portfolios, which represent a substantial part of the balance sheet (with the share of own funds becoming increasingly larger over the period under review). At the same time, the profit and loss account depends to an important degree on interest income and expenses, realised gains and losses, and write-downs on these portfolios. Secondly, strong banknote demand has gradually increased the size of the balance sheet since the euro changeover in 2002. Banknotes in circulation also provide a strong base for seigniorage income, which is an important item of the profit and loss account. Thirdly, the liquidity-providing operations in foreign currency, which the Eurosystem has undertaken since 2007 in response to the fi nancial crisis, increased significantly the size of the ECB's (and the Eurosystem's) balance sheet. In terms of income and expenses, these operations were rather immaterial at the level of the ECB, although the income generated was substantial at the Eurosystem level. The ECB has remained financially strong over the 11-year period. Factors that support the financial position are strong legislative provisions on e.g. independence and income, the use of financial buffers, seigniorage as a reliable income source and an effective loss-coverage mechanism.

Since 2008, excess liquidity - defined as the sum of holdings of central bank reserves in excess of reserve requirements and holdings of equivalent central bank deposits - has tended to accumulate in specific euro area countries and in a small, slowly changing group of credit institutions. Despite the stability of the concentration of excess liquidity in specific countries over time, the relevance of individual drivers has changed. First, risk aversion has played a much smaller role in explaining the concentration since 2013 than it did at the time of "flight-to-quality" phenomena in the period 2010-12. Second, the location of the relevant market infrastructures (i.e. central securities depositories, securities settlement systems and TARGET2 accounts) used by counterparties that sold assets to the Eurosystem has been a more important driver directing flows in the period 2015-16. In addition, the more recent concentration of excess liquidity is explained by the combination of a number of factors, such as banks following strict internal credit limits, investment incentives created by yield differences across the euro area and the "home bias" in euro area government bond holdings. Overall, the net cross-border flows of liquidity that resulted also determined TARGET2 balances. At the individual bank level, when controlling for banks' capital, non-performing loans, credit risk and profitability, excess liquidity holdings in relation to total assets are found to be higher for smaller and better-capitalised banks, and for banking groups with liquidity centralised at the head institution. In addition, participation in Eurosystem longer-term refinancing operations and deposit inflows are associated with liquidity accumulation. Finally, new regulatory initiatives such as the liquidity coverage ratio are explained to be creating incentives to hold or not to distribute liquidity, thereby affecting its distribution.