Search results

AbstractMotivated by a recent trend that advocates a reassessment of the aim of medical science and clinical practice, this paper investigates the epistemic aims of biomedical research. Drawing on contemporary discussions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, along with a recent study on scurvy, this paper (1) explores the concept of understanding as the aim of scientific inquiry and (2) establishes a framework that will guide the examination of its forms in biomedical research. Using the case of Tuberculosis (TB), (3) it is argued that grasping a mechanistic explanation is crucial for reaching a threshold of understanding at which we may speak of an objectual, biomedical understanding of TB.

The ideal of authenticity -- roughly that one should lead a life that is expressive of what the person takes herself to be -- has become a strong and widespread ethical deal with an immense impact on popular culture, most revealingly in the quest for authenticity in popular self-help literature. Contemporary philosophical accounts do not seem to pay sufficient attention to how the ideal of authenticity and certain practices in capitalism have shaped each other reciprocally. This essay will take initial steps in fulfilling that gap. Adapted from the source document.

Gesellschaftskritik, or social philosophy that aims to provide firm criticism of pathological social practices, requires normatively grounded evaluative principles. In this article, we assess different possibilities for such principles with focus on a model that takes specific patterns of intersubjective interaction as its point of reference. We argue that in order to understand the full significance of this 'intersubjective turn' for social philosophy, and to strengthen the normative foundation of social philosophy, we need to distinguish several levels of intersubjectivity and, in particular, focus on the somewhat neglected level of primary intersubjectivity. The article will discuss the account of primary intersubjectivity in Honneth's work. We show that Honneth's account runs into difficulties, and drawing on recent findings in developmental psychology, we suggest a rethinking of elementary recognition in terms of 'affective proximity'. This both renders the account less susceptible to criticism and provides a normative perspective that can effortlessly enter into interdisciplinary collaboration.