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Bizumic et al. (2013) have recently shown that attitudes towards peace and war reflect two distinct constructs rather than two poles of a single dimension. We present an attempt at validating the French version of their 16-item Attitudes toward Peace and War Scale (APWS) on five distinct (mainly Belgian) French-speaking samples (total N = 808). Confirmatory factor and criterion validity analyses confirmed that attitudes toward peace and war, although negatively related, are distinct in terms of their antecedents and consequences. On the one hand, antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in pro-peace behaviors. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included national identification and authoritarian ideological beliefs, and consequences included intentions to engage in pro-war behaviors. Furthermore, both attitudes toward peace and war were, respectively, negatively and positively related to (a right-wing) political orientation. Unexpectedly however, attitudes toward war were positively related to nonegalitarian ideological beliefs and were not related to personal distress. Scores on the translated scale were unrelated to socially desirable responding. In terms of known-groups validity, men had, respectively, more and less positive attitudes toward war and peace than women. Finally, based on exploratory factor analyses, the inclusion of some items for the factorial structure of the measure is questioned and a shortened form of the measure is validated. Overall, these findings are in line with Bizumic et al. and suggest that attitudes toward peace and war also reflect two distinct constructs in a French-speaking population. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This research aimed at examining the possibility that certain social representations of peace and war are, more than others, (in)compatible with support for warfare. It also aimed at investigating the weight of political culture on the realization of this possibility. Using the framework of social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961=2008), this study surveyed undergraduate students from 3 universities located in 2 countries: the United States and Denmark. Analyses conducted at the cultural and individual levels (Leung, 1989) show that the notions of peace as social transformation and of war as direct and indirect violence tend to be more prevalent among anti-war supporters and Danish participants, and indicate that the values and ideas of peace and war that are most incompatible with support of warfare are equality, fear, and poverty. Results are discussed with respect to their theoretical contribution and policy implications. Citizen peace activists developed ideas, analyses, actions, and organizations that established them as an irrepressible force. Nonetheless, they consistently failed to convert their countless efforts into the kind of political effectiveness that might move them into the main currents of American life. There were two reasons for this failure. The second was their overriding commitment to the peace of justice, freedom, and liberations within a conservative political culture that attached the highest value to notions of order, security, and stability. (DeBenedetti, 1988, p. 222).

This research aimed at examining the possibility that certain social representations of peace and war are, more than others, (in)compatible with support for warfare. It also aimed at investigating the weight of political culture on the realization of this possibility. Using the framework of social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961=2008), this study surveyed undergraduate students from 3 universities located in 2 countries: the United States and Denmark. Analyses conducted at the cultural and individual levels (Leung, 1989) show that the notions of peace as social transformation and of war as direct and indirect violence tend to be more prevalent among anti-war supporters and Danish participants, and indicate that the values and ideas of peace and war that are most incompatible with support of warfare are equality, fear, and poverty. Results are discussed with respect to their theoretical contribution and policy implications. Citizen peace activists developed ideas, analyses, actions, and organizations that established them as an irrepressible force. Nonetheless, they consistently failed to convert their countless efforts into the kind of political effectiveness that might move them into the main currents of American life. There were two reasons for this failure. The second was their overriding commitment to the peace of justice, freedom, and liberations within a conservative political culture that attached the highest value to notions of order, security, and stability. (DeBenedetti, 1988, p. 222).

The present research aimed at examining the possibility that certain social representations of peace and war are, more than others, (in)compatible with support for warfare. It also aimed at investigating the weight of political culture on the realization of this possibility. Using the framework of social representations theory or SRT (Moscovici, 1961/2008), we surveyed undergraduate students from three universities located in two countries, the US and Denmark. Analyses conducted at the cultural and individual levels (Leung, 1989) show that the notions of peace as social transformation and of war as direct and indirect violence tend to be more prevalent among anti-war supporters and Danish participants, and indicate that the values and ideas of peace and war that are most incompatible with support of warfare are equality, fear and poverty. Results are discussed with respect to their theoretical contribution and policy implications. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

De nombreuses études montrent que la mention de l'origine ethnique ou nationale des criminels est une pratique répandue dans les médias occidentaux. Pour identifier la valeur que les journalistes attribuent à cette information, nous avons analysé les éditoriaux publiés par six quotidiens belges, relatifs à l'affaire Joe Van Holsbeeck, du nom d'un adolescent tué par des individus qui tentaient de voler son lecteur MP3. L'analyse met en évidence que cette information sort le crime de son contexte immédiat pour l'inscrire dans un système de représentations préexistantes. En ce sens, la mention de l'origine ethnique ou nationale des suspects a une portée davantage référentielle qu'indicielle.

Belgium has a long-standing history of conflicts between Flemings and French- speakers. We posit that the content of the collective memories associated with each group are organized around two objective dimensions: 1) linguistic policy and 2) financial and political autonomy. A model is proposed which predicts that different justice principles will be applied by each community regarding the distribution of specific resources depending upon which dimension of the conflict is salient and their group membership. Respect or violation of these principles predicts stereotype content. Collective memories can be used to justify the in- group's justice principles and to present such stereotypes as anchored in the past. We conclude by drawing general implications of the model for the study of the role collective memories play in intergroup conflicts. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Belgium has a long-standing history of conflicts between Flemings and French speakers. We posit that the content of the collective memories associated with each group are organized around two objective dimensions: (1) linguistic policy and (2) financial and political autonomy. A model is proposed that predicts that different justice principles will be applied by each community regarding the distribution of specific resources depending upon which dimension of the conflict is salient and their group membership. Respect or violation of these principles predicts stereotype content. Collective memories can be used to justify the in-group's justice principles and to present such stereotypes as anchored in the past. We conclude by drawing general implications of the model for the study of the role collective memories play in intergroup conflicts.

Belgium has a long-standing history of conflicts between Flemings and French speakers. We posit that the content of the collective memories associated with each group are organized around two objective dimensions: (1) linguistic policy and (2) financial and political autonomy. A model is proposed that predicts that different justice principles will be applied by each community regarding the distribution of specific resources depending upon which dimension of the conflict is salient and their group membership. Respect or violation of these principles predicts stereotype content. Collective memories can be used to justify the in-group's justice principles and to present such stereotypes as anchored in the past. We conclude by drawing general implications of the model for the study of the role collective memories play in intergroup conflicts.

Although attitudes toward peace and war are usually treated as two opposite poles of one dimension, in this article we argue that they may represent two distinct dimensions. To investigate this idea, we developed and tested a new balanced measure, the Attitudes Toward Peace and War (APW) Scale, in three studies (N=4,742) in the United States and Denmark. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that attitudes toward peace and war formed two distinct, though negatively related, factors. Structural equation modeling showed that antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs, the values of international harmony and equality, and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in peace-related activities. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included authoritarian ideological beliefs, the values of national strength and order, and less personal distress, and consequences included intentions to engage in warlike activities. Results also showed that political affiliation had an impact on the relationship between peace and war attitudes, with conservatives less likely to find the attitudes incompatible. The findings support the view that attitudes toward peace and war represent two distinct dimensions.

Although attitudes toward peace and war are usually treated as two opposite poles of one dimension, in this article we argue that they may represent two distinct dimensions. To investigate this idea, we developed and tested a new balanced measure, the Attitudes Toward Peace and War (APW) Scale, in three studies (N=4,742) in the United States and Denmark. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that attitudes toward peace and war formed two distinct, though negatively related, factors. Structural equation modeling showed that antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs, the values of international harmony and equality, and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in peace-related activities. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included authoritarian ideological beliefs, the values of national strength and order, and less personal distress, and consequences included intentions to engage in warlike activities. Results also showed that political affiliation had an impact on the relationship between peace and war attitudes, with conservatives less likely to find the attitudes incompatible. The findings support the view that attitudes toward peace and war represent two distinct dimensions.

Comparing present and past situations by means of historical analogy is prevalent in political and public discourses. But when researching this phenomenon, scientists often use reception paradigms, where they ask people which past event is most applicable to a current situation or issue. In these paradigms, analogies are treated as unequivocal—rather than flexible—in their meanings. In this paper, we use a production paradigm to examine why European citizens (in France, Belgium, and Germany) selected historical analogies and justified their meanings following the two 2015 terrorist attacks in France. We find that most participants tend to mention a relatively small number of past events, characterized by similarities in time (recent), space (geographically close) and type (terrorist attacks) with the current attacks. However, a multiple correspondence analysis indicates that, even when they overwhelmingly agree about the relevance of a particular event (the attacks of September 11th 2001) for the present situation, participants confer widely varying—even conflicting—meanings to the "same" analogy, which align with different socio-political attitudes. We suggest that these variations do not just represent the emphasis that different participants place on particular sets of similarities between the past and the present attacks: They also embody specific, and conflicting, stances on salient and controversial issues surrounding the topic of contemporary terrorism (e.g., why were 'we' attacked, who deserves to be grieved, how should the government respond). Results are discussed in light of the literature on social representations of both history and terrorism.

Comparing present and past situations by means of historical analogy is prevalent in political and public discourses. But when researching this phenomenon, scientists often use reception paradigms, where they ask people which past event is most applicable to a current situation or issue. In these paradigms, analogies are treated as unequivocal—rather than flexible—in their meanings. In this paper, we use a production paradigm to examine why European citizens (in France, Belgium, and Germany) selected historical analogies and justified their meanings following the two 2015 terrorist attacks in France. We find that most participants tend to mention a relatively small number of past events, characterized by similarities in time (recent), space (geographically close) and type (terrorist attacks) with the current attacks. However, a multiple correspondence analysis indicates that, even when they overwhelmingly agree about the relevance of a particular event (the attacks of September 11th 2001) for the present situation, participants confer widely varying—even conflicting—meanings to the "same" analogy, which align with different socio-political attitudes. We suggest that these variations do not just represent the emphasis that different participants place on particular sets of similarities between the past and the present attacks: They also embody specific, and conflicting, stances on salient and controversial issues surrounding the topic of contemporary terrorism (e.g., why were 'we' attacked, who deserves to be grieved, how should the government respond). Results are discussed in light of the literature on social representations of both history and terrorism. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Although attitudes toward peace and war are usually treated as two opposite poles of one dimension, in this article we argue that they may represent two distinct dimensions. To investigate this idea, we developed and tested a new balanced measure, the Attitudes Toward Peace and War (APW) Scale, in three studies (N = 4,742) in the United States and Denmark. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that attitudes toward peace and war formed two distinct, though negatively related, factors. Structural equation modeling showed that antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs, the values of international harmony and equality, and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in peace‐related activities. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included authoritarian ideological beliefs, the values of national strength and order, and less personal distress, and consequences included intentions to engage in warlike activities. Results also showed that political affiliation had an impact on the relationship between peace and war attitudes, with conservatives less likely to find the attitudes incompatible. The findings support the view that attitudes toward peace and war represent two distinct dimensions.