Search results

This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negative liberties, something that capability theorists deny. On the other hand, to say that all capability rights are substantive in the sense that they themselves are capabilities (rights as capabilities) will in a significant number of cases fail to match well with our intuitions. This article presents an account of the relationship between rights and capabilities that avoids these problems of underspecification and of plausibility, respectively. First, it is argued that to take the idea of capability rights seriously, three new 'list issues' need to be addressed. Second, developing a point made by Nussbaum, it is argued that capability rights are to be defined as being purely instrumental. Whereas the resulting analysis of capability rights solves the problems of underspecification and plausibility, it raises doubts about the claim that the capability approach gives more importance to rights than do traditional forms of consequentialism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negative liberties, something that capability theorists deny. On the other hand, to say that all capability rights are substantive in the sense that they themselves are capabilities (rights as capabilities) will in a significant number of cases fail to match well with our intuitions. This article presents an account of the relationship between rights and capabilities that avoids these problems of underspecification and of plausibility, respectively. First, it is argued that to take the idea of capability rights seriously, three new 'list issues' need to be addressed. Second, developing a point made by Nussbaum, it is argued that capability rights are to be defined as being purely instrumental. Whereas the resulting analysis of capability rights solves the problems of underspecification and plausibility, it raises doubts about the claim that the capability approach gives more importance to rights than do traditional forms of consequentialism.

Abstract New institutionalism is an approach to the study of social events that is becoming increasingly popular. Different lines of new institutional research can be distinguished. In one line of research it is argued that the social sciences should transcend reductionist modes of explanation, in particular the methodological individualism exemplified by the theory of rational choice. In this view, reductionism does not permit the endogenous treatment of institutions and thus cannot account for important aspects of the social and political context in which agents act. In this paper the meaning of the terms 'methodological individualism' and 'reductionism' is discussed and illustrated by a description of some of the central assumptions of rational choice theory, in particular game theory. It is argued that the claim that reductionism should be transcended is unwarranted: reductionism is perfectly compatible with the new institutional concerns. First of all, the various institutional dimensions that have been distinguished in the new institutional literature can be systematically described in terms of a game–theoretic model. Furthermore, the dynamic models of game theory can be (and often already have been) used to explain the emergence of institutions

IN ONE LINE OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH, SCHOLARS ARGUE THAT THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SHOULD TRANSCEND REDUCTIONIST MODES OF EXPLANATION, IN PARTICULAR THE METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE. IN THIS VIEW, REDUCTIONISM DOES NOT PERMIT THE ENDOGENOUS TREATMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND THUS CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH AGENTS ACT. IN THIS PAPER, THE MEANINGS OF THE TERMS "METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM" AND "REDUCTIONISM" ARE DISCUSSED AND ILLUSTRATED BY A DESCRIPTION OF SOME CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, ESPECIALLY GAME THEORY. THE CLAIM THAT REDUCTIONISM SHOULD BE TRANSCENDED IS UNWARRANTED; REDUCTIONISM IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS. THE VARIOUS INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN DISTINGUISHED IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL LITERATURE CAN BE SYSTEMATICALLY DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL. FURTHERMORE, THE DYNAMIC MODELS OF GAME THEORY CAN BE USED TO EXPLAIN THE EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONS.

In his methodological comments about the study of ethics and politics, Aristotle famously remarked that one should not demand more precision from the study of a subject than that subject allows.1 He has sometimes been interpreted as suggesting that analyt

In his methodological comments about the study of ethics and politics, Aristotle famously remarked that one should not demand more precision from the study of a subject than that subject allows.1 He has sometimes been interpreted as suggesting that analyt

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the 'sincerity argument', according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the 'transparency' argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the 'sincerity argument', according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the 'transparency' argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the 'sincerity argument', according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the 'transparency' argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

This paper considers theoretically the relationship between what rights people may be said to have, the normatively defensible distribution of wealth between people within nations and across the world, and people's empirical responses to poverty within their own state and across the world. We argue that rights are universal, and that rights and freedoms do entail a duty to reduce poverty. However freedom is defined, greater poverty entails, either conceptually or causally, reduced freedom. Since levels of freedom determine the material existence or non‐existence of rights, poverty affects the rights that people can be said to enjoy. However, the duty to reduce poverty does not imply a duty to ensure universally uniform provision, which is neither an empirically plausible expectation nor a requirement of justice. Nonetheless, we owe more to the world's poor today than we did in the past. Globalisation expands the moral community that we live in and thus affects our and others' rights and duties: the greater the level of economic interaction, and the greater the interdependencies of economies, the greater the extent to which the threshold values below which rights lack material existence are likely to converge. In particular, the growth of such interdependencies entails that the threshold values for the developing world should increase.