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An important focus of empirical accounts of representative democracy is the policy-opinion nexus. Drawing from the thermostatic model (Wlezien, 1995), this study examines the dynamic relationship between public opinion and immigration policy, one of the more salient issue domains that have reshaped European democracies since the 1980s. As a counter-factual to social identity accounts of immigration politics, this study argues citizens have policy preferences and when immigration policy changes, the demand responds. The result is a known movement between opinions and policy that we describe as an 'immigration thermostat'. We rely on dozens of high-quality surveys (more than 500 separate series, corresponding to nearly 2,500 marginals) and a dyadic-ratios algorithm to design comparable immigration opinion measures for 13 countries. We find evidence of both public and policy responsiveness for immigration, although not to the same extent. This suggests an asymmetrical 'immigration thermostat' but effective representation in the immigration domain across Western Europe.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism has a wide‐ranging impact on a polity. At the same time, a complementary, yet less extensive body of research discusses the impact of terrorism on the crux of representative democracy, namely its citizens. In contribution to that literature, and to further explore how external shocks affect public opinions, we propose a two‐dimensional analytical framework to examine the effects of the November 2015 terrorist events in Paris and Saint Denis. Drawing from extant scholarship, we argue that we can expect both in‐group solidarity and out‐group hostility to increase in direct response to these events. This study relies on a regression discontinuity design to analyse a representative survey (DREES) that was in the field at the time of the events. Findings are two‐fold. First, and perhaps surprisingly, we find no conclusive evidence of increasing out‐group hostilities as a direct consequence of the terrorist events. Second, we find a definite strengthening of in‐group solidarity indicators following the events. This not only confirms that citizens adjust their opinions in response to environmental stimuli, but also highlights the democratic resilience of citizens, particularly when faced with a collective threat. Altogether, these findings add to our understanding of why and how individual behaviour changes in light of exogenous shocks.

Abstract
Citizens' support for redistribution varies largely between and within countries. An important empirical challenge in this field is the scarcity of comparative data, which this study overcomes by designing a novel time-series cross-sectional dataset that spans more than three decades in seven European countries. Using nearly 300 surveys and a dyadic ratios algorithm, we estimate aggregate redistributive preferences for each country, as well as for population strata within countries based on household income. We then ask to what extent support for redistribution varies across the rich and the poor. We find that citizens are not systematically becoming more reluctant toward or more supportive of redistribution. While redistributive preferences of the rich and the poor do not strictly move in parallel, there is no polarization between the two. Moreover, both the demand for redistribution and the preference gap between the rich and the poor evolve in a cyclical way.

AbstractScholars are increasingly interested in 'populist attitudes', which – studies show – can explain party support and vote choice. However, current research has not yet analyzed in detail the characteristics of those individuals with populist proclivities, or so-calledpopulist citizens. To address this research gap, we harmonize survey data on populist attitudes for nine European countries, five Latin American countries, and Turkey in order to uncover shared or distinct features of populist citizens. Our findings are threefold. First, we identify differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of populist citizens, notably between Europe and Latin America. Second, we find similar patterns of heterogeneity in the political features of populist citizens. Third, we show that populist citizens across all countries have the same democratic profile. They systematically support democracy over other forms of government, while being dissatisfied with its implementation. This suggests populist attitudes are intrinsic to the political culture of contemporary democracies.