Search results

The concept of agent-responsibility for an outcome (that is, of the outcome reflecting the autonomous choice of the agent) is central to both ethics and political philosophy. The concept, however, remains radically under-explored. In particular, the issue of partial responsibility for an outcome needs further development. I propose an account of partial responsibility based on partial causal contribution. Agents who choose autonomously in full knowledge of the consequences are agent-responsible, I claim, for the shift in the objective probability of the outcome in question that her choice induces. Thus, agents will typically be only partially agent-responsible (that is, for a shift of less than 100 percent) for any given outcome. The model has an implication that is generally rejected: that agents who purchase lottery tickets and win are agent-responsible for only part of the winnings.

Although Robert Nozick has argued that libertarianism is compatible
with the justice of a minimal state—even if does not arise from
mutual consent—few have been persuaded. I will outline a different
way of establishing that a non-consensual libertarian state can be just. I
will show that a state can—with a few important
qualifications—justly enforce the rights of citizens, extract
payments to cover the costs of such enforcement, redistribute resources to
the poor, and invest in infrastructure to overcome market failures.