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The response to the so‐called refugee crisis of 2015 in the European Union was haphazard and inconsistent with the stated mission of solidarity. This article situates the EU's response and its Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as defensive integration producing the lowest common denominator policies. It argues that the rise of right‐wing populism redefines solidarity in narrow and exclusionary terms, in contrast to the inclusive and global solidarity espoused by the EU. Drawing on Germany as a case study of how domestic populist pressures also rise to the European level, the article juxtaposes the demise of the EU's temporary relocation system (an attempt at internal inclusive solidarity) and the success of the EU-Turkey deal (an attempt at externalization and risk avoidance), both initiatives led by Germany. Solidarity efforts championed by Germany were quickly stymied by (Central Eastern European) member states that not only rejected efforts at temporary solutions but blocked efforts to develop permanent mechanisms and a substantive CEAS reform.

With its focus on the external dimension of the rapidly evolving European Union immigration policies, this article seeks to contribute to the debates on the EU's impact on states and international relations in two ways. Firstly, it seeks to move beyond the inward-looking focus of contemporary studies on the EU's effects on the member states, and proposes a framework for analyzing its external effects on non-EU member states. Secondly, and in contrast to traditional accounts of the EU's strengthening international role, which focus on external trade policy or foreign and security policy, it highlights a hitherto overlooked aspect of the EU's foreign relations related to immigration control. Drawing on the recent literature on Europeanization and policy transfer, it is shown that the external effects of European policies take place along a continuum that runs from fully voluntary to more constrained forms of adaptation, and include a variety of modes such as unilateral emulation, adaptation by externality, and policy transfer through conditionality. The scope and shape of policy transfer is conditioned by existing institutional links between the EU and the third countries concerned, the latter's domestic situation at hand, and the costs of nonadaptation associated with an EU policy.