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Cover -- Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I LIFE'S BEGINNING -- Uniquely Valued -- 1 Cherished Uniqueness -- 2 Experience and Underwriting Intrinsic Moral Worth -- 3 Parental Love as a Moral Power -- Reconceptualizing the Moral Self -- 1 Parenting as the Fullest Expression of Unconditional Love -- 2. Parenting and the Argument from Genes and Self-Interest -- 3. Self-Interest as the Best Explanation -- 4. A Supposed Lesson from Robinson Crusoe -- 5. Parenting as an Open-Ended Commitment -- Part II THE CRUCIBLE OF SOCIETY -- The Family as a Model for Society -- 1 Some Preliminary Remarks -- 2 Parental Love and a Conception of the Right -- 3 Fellow-Feeling and a Conception of the Right -- 4 Love and Fellow-Feeling Are Not Zero-Sum -- 5 Self-Command -- From Family to E Pluribus Unum -- 1 Beyond Self-Interest -- 2 Moral Personhood -- 3 Community and Moral Personhood -- 4 Social Unity and the Affective Sentiments -- 5 The Backdrop of Flourishing -- Epilogue: Liberty: Between Plato and Modern Liberalism -- Index.

AbstractIt is generally agreed that Kant went too far in his claim that it is wrong to lie even if doing so will save an individual's life. The question remains whether it is morally permissible to tell a lie even if this does not involve saving the life of another individual. In this essay, I seek to answer this question affirmatively while at the same time setting strong constraints for when a lie (not involving saving a life) is morally permissible. I argue that lying is morally permissible in the face of what I call an egregious morally infelicitous question. Further, in some cases, lying is not only morally permissible but even reflects an unmistakable instance of considerable self-sacrifice. Needless to say, lies that constitute an instance of self-sacrifice are extremely rare. However, this possibility brings into sharp relief the truth that a lie need not stem from unsavory moral motives; it is upon this truth that the argument that it is morally permissible to lie in the face of an egregious morally infelicitous question relies. This essay ends with the quite poignant observation that there is nothing stable about out a society in which, owing to an unfailing duty to tell the truth, a person can obtain the truth merely by asking an egregious morally infelicitous question.

There is a way of doing moral philosophy which goes something like this: If it can be shown that it is rational for perfectly selfish people to accept the constraints of morality, then it will follow,a fortiori, that it is rational for people capable of affective bonds, and thus less selfish, to do so. On this way of proceeding the real argument – that is, the argument for the actual constraints (theory or principles) to be adopted – proceeds with only fully rational individuals who have no other concern than to maximize their nontuistic (selfish) preferences. Then it is noted that the affective capacities of human beings actually make quite palatable the constraints that the fully rational persons with wholly nontuistic preferences have agreed upon.