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In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of "decontrolled" financial innovations because they were enjoying from the "great moderation." Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital flows augmented in relevance thereafter. Initially economic authorities accurately responded to the challenge, but unconventional monetary policies in the US began to create important spillovers in EMEs. Furthermore, in contrast to a previous surge in liquidity, funds were now transmitted to EMEs throughout the bond market. The perspective of an increase in US interest rates by the FED is generating a reversal of expectations and a sudden flight to quality. Emerging countries' currencies began to experience higher volatility levels, and depreciation movements against a newly strong US dollar are also increasingly observed. Consequently, there are increasing doubts that the "unexpected" favorable outcome observed in most EMEs at the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) would remain

In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of "decontrolled" financial innovations because they were enjoying from the "great moderation." Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital

In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of "decontrolled" financial innovations because they were enjoying from the "great moderation." Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital flows augmented in relevance thereafter. Initially economic authorities accurately responded to the challenge, but unconventional monetary policies in the US began to create important spillovers in EMEs. Furthermore, in contrast to a previous surge in liquidity, funds were now transmitted to EMEs throughout the bond market. The perspective of an increase in US interest rates by the FED is generating a reversal of expectations and a sudden flight to quality. Emerging countries' currencies began to experience higher volatility levels, and depreciation movements against a newly strong US dollar are also increasingly observed. Consequently, there are increasing doubts that the "unexpected" favorable outcome observed in most EMEs at the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) would remain.

In the past, foreign shocks arrived to national economies mainly through trade channels, and transmissions of such shocks took time to come into effect. However, after capital globalization, shocks spread to markets almost immediately. Despite the increasing macroeconomic dangers that the situation generated at emerging markets in the South, nobody at the North was ready to acknowledge the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the inner weakness of "decontrolledâ€_x009d_ financial innovations because they were enjoying from the "great moderation.â€_x009d_ Monetary policy was primarily centered on price stability objectives, without considering the mounting credit and asset price booms being generated by market liquidity and the problems generated by this glut. Mainstream economists, in turn, were not majorly attracted in integrating financial factors in their models. External pressures on emerging market economies (EMEs) were not eliminated after 2008, but even increased as international capital

El actual calentamiento que padece nuestro planeta es, sin lugar a duda, resultado del accionar humano. Los cambios en el clima se volverán más recurrentes, y generarán problemas económicos más agudos. El traspasar los límites de la tierra, por otra parte, empuja al clima, así como a la naturaleza, a ámbitos desconocidos: territorios donde prima el no -saber. ¿Cómo tomar decisiones en dicho contexto? La incertidumbre radical nos obliga a tomar decisiones "en la más densa oscuridad", lugar donde las narrativas pueden proveernos de una explicación para los eventos que no pueden ser explicados.

Fifty years ago, the role of foreign investors was at the center of the political debate, with host state - investors disputes showing a geographical North-Southth pattern. The end of the ISI model would signal a new era, including a new relationship with foreign investors. As part of their efforts, developing and emerging countries (DECs) liberalize foreign direct investment (FDI) national policies and to provide fiscal and other incentives to foreign investors. FDI flows were seen as always beneficial: a quantitative approach. Sooner than later, however, policy-makers became aware of the scheme's pro-investment bias. FDI quality, not quantity, became the new ideal. Latin American countries' position in the issue, however, remains quantitative objectives still dominate the investment debate. Indeed, a movement towards sustainability would come to question the natural-resource led growth model followed by the region. So, the debate around the treatment of foreign investors remains open.

This article develops a framework to evaluate net benefits from mining and utilizes it to assess the Marlin mine in Guatemala. The framework integrates "weak" and "strong" sustainability principles. Under weak sustainability, a net gain in human welfare can substitute for the loss of nonrenewable resources. Under strong sustainability, nature's life-support systems are not substitutable. We define "net benefits" as the joint generation of net gains to human welfare, defined as local acceptance and high economic benefits, and low risks to the resilience of environmental life-support systems, especially water, evidenced by best practice management standards. We find little evidence that the Marlin mine meets either weak or strong sustainability criteria: there is strong local resistance to the mine and economic benefits are low, while environmental risk is high, especially in terms of potential long-term contamination of life-supporting ground and surface water.

Unlike the train of events in previous crises, when the negotiations between the parties - creditors and debtors, investors and host countries - were played out within some kind of institutional framework, the crisis of 2001 portrayed Argentina as a country abandoned to its fate, not just once, but twice. But although investors had initially been able to alter the rules in their favour to secure better protection and enhanced legal certainty, ultimately they came out of the situation worse off. The Argentine experience suggests that, as the influence of the international financial institutions declines, asymmetric solutions cannot last and, at the end of the day, democratic governments will put their electorate before their investors. But is the Argentine case an exception to the rule or does it reflect a more general weakening of foreign investment protection? (CEPAL Rev/GIGA)