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1. Introduction -- 2. Populism, Clientelism and Corruption and the International Crisis of Democracy -- 3. The Pendulum of Democracy in Post-Yugoslav Successor States: Causes of the Backsliding of Democracy -- 4. Economy, Culture and Party System: Preconditions for State-Society Relations Eroding Democracy -- 5. Populism as a Type of State-Society Relations Eroding Democracy -- 6. Political clientelism as a Type of State-Society Relations Eroding Democracy -- 7. Political corruption as a Type of State-Society Relations Eroding Democracy -- 8. How Elected Governments Make Democracies Backslide: the Case of Serbia -- 9. How Elected Governments Make Democracies Backslide: the Case of Montenegro -- 10. How Elected Governments Make Democracies Backslide: the case of North Macedonia -- 11. Prolonging or Halting Democratic Erosion in Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia: a Comparison -- 12. Conclusions.

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are backpedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated democratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Although not present in all back-sliding democracies, populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy.

The article discusses corruption, anticorruption and democracy in the Western Balkans, with an emphasis on FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and (less so) Serbia. The article does not advance a claim that its conclusions are valid for all West Balkan democracies. The main question is the following: what the political functions of corruption are (beyond its economic functions) and how corruption serves in reproducing the same elites in power. The research presented in the article shows that high-level or grand political corruption in FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, is something larger than a side-benefit of exercising government authority. Such corruption is one of the several means which an elite purposefully uses to stay in power, that was originally attained by winning democratic elections. Furthermore, anticorruption mechanisms are often used with a sole purpose to discredit political opponents, especially those in the opposition. Democracy in the Western Balkans is, thus, distorted in obvious, but also in less obvious ways. ; U članku se razmatraju korupcija, antikorupcija i demokracija na Zapadnom Balkanu s naglaskom na Makedoniju, Crnu Goru i manjim dijelom na Srbiju. Zaključci članka ne vrijede nužno za sve demokracije Zapadnog Balkana. Glavna istraživačka pitanja su slijedeća: koje su političke funkcije korupcije (pored ekonomskih dobitaka) i kako korupcija služi za reproduciranje istih elita na vlasti. Istraživanje prikazano u članku pokazuje da je korupcija na najvišim razinama vlasti u Makedoniji, Crnoj Gori i Srbiji ipak nešto više nego popratna ekonomska dobit od vršenja vlasti. Takva je korupcija sredstvo koje elite koriste kako bi zadržale vlast koju su izvorno dobile na demokratskim izborima. Nadalje, antikorupcijski mehanizmi se zapravo često koriste kako bi se diskreditirali politički protivnici u opoziciji. Demokracija na Zapadnom Balkanu je tako iskrivljena na očite, ali i na manje očite načine.

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are backpedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated democratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Although not present in all back-sliding democracies, populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy.

Before the economic crisis erupted, the public bureaucracies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had embarked on public administration reforms reflecting Neo-Weberian and New Public Management influences. After the onset of the crisis, which functioned as a critical juncture, reforms of public administration and the structures and functions of government decision-making were hastily effected. Administrative reforms reflected almost exclusively New Public Management concerns, whereas reforms of government indicated a rapid concentration and centralisation of power at the summit of the executive. A combination of 'goodness-of-fit' and historical institutionalist theories and fiscal pressures exerted by the international economic and institutional environment may explain the abruptness, extent and direction of reform. Southern European governments and public bureaucracies have preserved only some of the historical legacies of government and bureaucratic organisation, but have hurriedly adapted to externally induced pressures to reform.

The recent economic crisis has led to a deterioration of the social situation in the Western Balkans. Already before the crisis, a combination of war and conflict, legacies of economic underdevelopment, labour market problems, inadequate social expenditure, and faltering economic growth had produced lingering poverty, unemployment, and income inequality. These trends can be explained in the context of fragmented and uneven welfare regimes that do not approximate any of the available types of welfare capitalism. From 2009 to 2012, the economies of the region suffered from a 'double dip' recession, which exacerbated earlier adverse social effects. Poverty, which had been partly alleviated before 2008, became extensive again, while unemployment has been on the rise over the last five years. Extreme poverty, new poverty, and youth unemployment are examples of the crisis' effects. In spite of this situation, the policy responses of West Balkan governments to the social effects of the crisis have been haphazard, while international assistance never considered the fight against poverty to be a major priority. Such a fight, however, calls for a combination of new, socially sensitive priorities on the part of international donors, including international financial institutions and the eu, and a more systematic 'welfare effort' by national governments in the region. A human security-based strategy will also be needed in order to avoid further deterioration in the living conditions of the poverty-stricken categories of the Western Balkan populations. National governments will therefore need to reconstruct the welfare regimes of the West Balkan states, which have been left incomplete since the transitions of 1989.

After World War II, Greece and Italy experienced a Left-Right political polarization and a repetition of earlier patterns of political patronage. Both countries received international aid, including emergency relief, interim loans, and Marshall Plan funds. By the beginning of the 1950s, Italy had progressed from stabilization to reconstruction and then to development, while Greece progressed belatedly with reconstruction and did not achieve stabilization until after the end of the Marshall Plan. The different outcomes are explained by institutional legacies and historical conjunctures, such as the disastrous Greek Civil War; the tradition of developmental Italian state agencies, such as prewar Italy's Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), a state-controlled conglomerate, which Greece lacked; government instability, which prior to 1950 had tormented Greece more than Italy; distrust from the Greek middle and upper classes of the political and administrative elites; and the prevalence of an economic culture fostering industrialization in Italy, which emerged only belatedly in Greece.

After the Second World War, both Greece and Italy experienced a Left-Right political polarization and a reproduction of earlier patterns of political patronage. Both Italy and Greece received international aid, including emergency relief, interim loans, and Marshall Plan funds. By the beginning of the 1950s, the Italian economy had recovered better from war destruction and had achieved industrial growth faster than Greece. Italy progressed quite rapidly from stabilization to reconstruction, and then on to development, while Greece progressed with reconstruction, but did not achieve stabilization until after the end of the Marshall Plan. Italy and Greece were obviously different with regard to population and market size, but the outcome of the foreign aid they received, differed in the two countries. This paper suggests that the different outcome is explained by historical legacies and conjunctures, as well as series of institutional, cultural, and political factors. Greece underwent a disastrous Nazi occupation (1941-44) and the destructive Civil War (1946-49) of which Italy was spared. The Italian public sector was endowed with state agencies steering economic development, which the Greek public sector lacked until the early 1950s. Italian elections resulted in more stable governments, led by the Christian Democratic Party, which followed their own policy choices, often deviating from the donors' policy preference. This was a pattern absent from the long sequence of unstable and internally fragmented Greek governments. The Italian governing elites relied on a social alliance of middle and upper classes, while in Greece the corresponding classes distrusted the government, and resisted government policies. Finally, an economic culture fostering heavy industrialization, in the context of pragmatist liberal economic policies, was present in Italy, but absent in Greece.