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AbstractPolitical leaders' willingness to use force is central to many explanations of foreign policy and interstate conflict. Unfortunately, existing indicators typically measure one aspect of this general concept, have limited coverage, and/or are not derived independently of leaders' participation in interstate conflicts. We develop a strategy for constructing measures of leaders' underlying willingness to use force with data on their background experiences, political orientations, and psychological traits in a Bayesian latent variable framework. Our approach produces measures of latent hawkishness for all national leaders between 1875 and 2004 that offer advantages over existing proxies along multiple dimensions, including construct validity, predictive validity, and measurement uncertainty. Importantly, our statistical framework allows scholars to build upon our measures by incorporating additional data and altering the assumptions underlying our models.

ALTHOUGH THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES IS VOTERS WHO SPLIT THEIR BALLOTS BETWEEN PARTIES, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF EITHER PATTERNS OR SOURCES OF TICKET-SPLITTING IN RECENT YEARS. INSTEAD, DIVERGENT LINES OF RESEARCH HAVE EMPHASIZED SUCH ELEMENTS AS VOTER PARTISANSHIP, INCUMBENCY, AND A "NEW" (YOUNG, WELL-EDUCATED, EVEN PARTISAN) KIND OF TICKET-SPLITTER, AND THE FOCUS HAS TOO OFTEN BEEN RESTRICTED TO THE ATYPICAL PRESIDENT-CONGRESS PAIR. THE AUTHORS UNIFY THESE RESEARCH TRADITIONS IN A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF SPLIT-TICKET VOTING AND TEST IT ACROSS THE PARTISAN BALLOT IN A TYPICAL ELECTION SETTING--THE CONTESTS FOR FIVE OHIO STATEWIDE OFFICES IN 1990. THE MODEL INCORPORATES PARTISAN STRENGTH, CANDIDATE VISIBILITY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT DISTINGUISH THE "NEW" TICKET-SPLITTERS. THE RESULTS SUPPORT THE PARTISAN-STRENGTH AND CANDIDATE-VISIBILITY EXPLANATIONS BUT PROVIDE LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF TICKET-SPLITTER.

The primary source of divided government in the United States is voters who split their ballots between the parties. Yet there has been little comprehensive examination of either patterns or sources of ticket splitting in recent years. Instead, divergent lines of research have emerged, emphasizing such things as voter partisanship, incumbency, and a "new" (young, well-educated, even partisan) kind of ticket splitter; and their focus has been too often restricted to the atypical president–Congress pair. We seek to unify these research traditions in a comprehensive model of split-ticket voting and to test this model across the partisan ballot in a typical election setting-here, the contests for five Ohio state-wide offices in 1990. The model incorporates partisan strength, candidate visibility, and the individual characteristics that distinguish the "new ticket splitters". The results support our partisan strength and candidate visibility explanations but provide little support for the emergence of a new type of ticket splitter.

Objective. Recent studies of the impact of black elite electoral success on the system‐supporting attitudes of black citizens have yielded mixed, but generally unimpressive, empirical results. We extend this limited research by examining the effects of the presence of black judicial officials on public attitudes toward a state judicial system.Methods. We employ data from a telephone survey of citizens in Mississippi and develop multivariate models to test for the effects of black judges on citizens' evaluations of the fairness of judges, equity in sentences, and overall impartiality of the state judicial system.Results. We find no systematic evidence that the election of black judicial officials ameliorates the suspicions of the black public regarding the fairness of the state courts.Conclusions. Our findings are in line with other recent studies on the limited effects of black elite electoral success on the attitudes of the black public and generally support a "political reality" model of political trust rather than an "empowerment model."

Objective. Recent studies of the impact of black elite electoral success on the system-supporting attitudes of black citizens have yielded mixed, but generally unimpressive, empirical results. We extend this limited research by examining the effects of the presence of black judicial officials on public attitudes toward a state judicial system. Methods. We employ data from a telephone survey of citizens in Mississippi & develop multivariate models to test for the effects of black judges on citizens' evaluations of the fairness of judges, equity in sentences, & overall impartiality of the state judicial system. Results. We find no systematic evidence that the election of black judicial officials ameliorates the suspicions of the black public regarding the fairness of the state courts. Conclusions. Our findings are in line with other recent studies on the limited effects of black elite electoral success on the attitudes of the black public & generally support a "political reality" model of political trust rather than an "empowerment model.". 2 Tables, 43 References. Adapted from the source document.