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"Historically confined to the disadvantaged ranks of the stratification system, evangelical Christians have increasingly joined the corporate elite, eliciting concern from some and sanguinity from others. Quantitative studies of the effects of religion on executive behavior have thus far shown mixed and inconclusive effects, and those few qualitative analyses that have focused on evangelical business leaders have generally emphasized conflict between religion and business but failed adequately to explore areas of consonance. While evangelical executives do, in fact, experience conflict associated with their professional contexts, this tension arises not because business and religion are inherently opposed, as some have argued, but because evangelical business leaders are made to feel like second-class citizens by members of their own faith communities. Indeed, in cases of apparent conflict between faith and business, evangelical executives insist that it is faith, not business, that must be reconceived. Equipped with an array of strategies for demonstrating that business is a sacred institution and a worthy occupation, evangelical business leaders hope to restore faith in business as they apply their faith in business. In these evangelical executives and their accounts, the "spirit of capitalism," defined by Max Weber as a positive attitude toward both work and wealth, finds ongoing embrace and new expression, with implications for understanding the so-called faith at work movement, evangelicalism, and the role of religion among elites"--

Baptizing Business sifts through popular perceptions regarding the relationship between business and religion and the agenda of conservative Christian business leaders, drawing on personal interviews with the most diverse group of evangelical executives yet studied.

'Baptizing Business' sifts through popular perceptions regarding the relationship between business and religion and the agenda of conservative Christian business leaders, drawing on personal interviews with the most diverse group of evangelical executives yet studied.

This paper applies the logic of commitment problems to deliver insights about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the canonical crisis bargaining framework, an anticipated power shift can cause bargaining failure. Bargaining breaks down in this context because a declining state reasons that fighting in the present from a strong position is preferable to negotiating in the future from a weaker position. I argue that this logic is relevant for understanding both Ukrainian and Russian decisionmaking in the lead-up to the invasion. The commitment problem logic also provides insight into the role of NATO in the conflict, highlighting flaws in existing arguments that the Russian invasion was "provoked" by NATO.

One way nuclear agreements might keep signatories from proliferating is by constraining nuclear capacity. Theoretical work on nonproliferation often points to such constraints as an important driver of nonproliferation success. Some have argued that, absent sufficient constraint, states with the desire and capability to proliferate will do so. Faced with more costly routes to a weapon, states subject to technological constraint may abide by the terms of the deal. This perspective poses an important empirical question: do nonproliferation agreements result in significant technological constraint in practice? This article evaluates the empirical prevalence of constraints arising from nonproliferation deals. Doing so requires (1) providing an appropriate measure of nuclear proficiency and (2) developing an estimate of the counterfactual, no-agreement capacity of states that received such agreements. This study addresses both of these points. First, new data are gathered to estimate proficiency, improving upon existing measures in the literature. Second, the generalized synthetic control method is applied to estimate counterfactual proficiency levels for the recipients of agreements. With this approach, the constraining effects of deals the United States implemented with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and the Declaration of Iguaçu between Brazil and Argentina are evaluated. The findings indicate that the constraining effect of these nonproliferation agreements is minimal.

The causes and consequences of nuclear proficiency are central to important questions in international relations. At present, researchers tend to use observable characteristics as a proxy. However, aggregation is a problem: existing measures implicitly assume that each indicator is equally informative and that measurement error is not a concern. We overcome these issues by applying a statistical measurement model to directly estimate nuclear proficiency from observed indicators. The resulting estimates form a new dataset on nuclear proficiency which we call ν-CLEAR. We demonstrate that these estimates are consistent with known patterns of nuclear proficiency while also uncovering more nuance than existing measures. Additionally, we demonstrate how scholars can use these estimates to account for measurement error by revisiting existing results with our measure.

How do new leaders impact crisis negotiations? We argue that opposing states know less about such a leader's resolve over the issues at stake. To fully appreciate the consequences, we develop a multi-period bargaining model of negotiations. In equilibrium, as a proposer becomes close to certain of its opponent's type, the duration and intensity of war goes to 0. We then test whether increase in leader tenure decrease the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Our estimates indicate that crises involving new leaders are 25.3 percent more likely to last one month than crises involving leaders with four years of tenure. Moreover, such conflicts are more likely to result in higher fatality levels. These results further indicate that leader tenure is a useful proxy for uncertainty.

How do new leaders impact crisis negotiations? We argue that opposing states know less about such a leader's resolve over the issues at stake. To fully appreciate the consequences, we develop a multi-period bargaining model of negotiations. In equilibrium, as a proposer becomes close to certain of its opponent's type, the duration and intensity of war goes to 0. We then test whether increase in leader tenure decrease the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Our estimates indicate that crises involving new leaders are 25.3 percent more likely to last one month than crises involving leaders with four years of tenure. Moreover, such conflicts are more likely to result in higher fatality levels. These results further indicate that leader tenure is a useful proxy for uncertainty.

The causes and consequences of nuclear proficiency are central to important questions in international relations. At present, researchers tend to use observable characteristics as a proxy. However, aggregation is a problem: existing measures implicitly assume that each indicator is equally informative and that measurement error is not a concern. We overcome these issues by applying a statistical measurement model to directly estimate nuclear proficiency from observed indicators. The resulting estimates form a new dataset on nuclear proficiency which we call ν-CLEAR. We demonstrate that these estimates are consistent with known patterns of nuclear proficiency while also uncovering more nuance than existing measures. Additionally, we demonstrate how scholars can use these estimates to account for measurement error by revisiting existing results with our measure.

AbstractIf military alliances cause significant shifts in the distribution of power, why does anticipation of their formation or expansion provoke hostility from adversaries in some cases and not others? We develop a theory to explain this variation, advancing three arguments about the connection between alliances, commitment problems and war. First, we show that prospective allies can avoid provoking a common enemy by offering concessions to offset losses from an anticipated power shift from an alliance. Second, limits to an alliance's power or implementation speed may make such bargains possible. Allies manipulate these factors to set the terms of cooperation to avoid provoking a shared enemy. Finally, when such bargains are not possible, incentives for preventive war exist but the outbreak of such wars may be avoided. Although preventive war cannot be ruled out altogether, the conditions that make it most attractive also make it unlikely to be carried out.