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Because we engage with the world and each other through our bodies and bodily movements, being able to represent one's own and others' bodies is fundamental to human perception, cognition and behaviour. This edited book brings together, for the first time, developmental perspectives on the growth of body knowledge in infancy and early childhood and how it intersects with other aspects of perception and cognition. The book is organised into three sections addressing the bodily self, the bodies of others and integrating self and other. Topics include perception and representation of the human form, infant imitation, understanding biological motion, self-representation, intention understanding, action production and perception and children's human figure drawings. Each section includes chapters from leading international scholars drawn together by an expert commentary that highlights open questions and directions for future research

Abstract Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that toddlers have access to an analog‐magnitude number representation that supports numerical reasoning about relatively large numbers. Three‐year‐olds were presented with subtraction problems in which initial set size and proportions subtracted were systematically varied. Two sets of cookies were presented and then covered. The experimenter visibly subtracted cookies from the hidden sets, and the children were asked to choose which of the resulting sets had more. In Experiment 1, performance was above chance when high proportions of objects (3 versus 6) were subtracted from large sets (of 9) and for the subset of older participants (older than 3 years, 5 months; n= 15), performance was also above chance when high proportions (10 versus 20) were subtracted from the very large sets (of 30). In Experiment 2, which was conducted exclusively with older 3‐year‐olds and incorporated an important methodological control, the pattern of results for the subtraction tasks was replicated. In both experiments, success on the tasks was not related to counting ability. The results of these experiments support the hypothesis that young children have access to an analog‐magnitude system for representing large approximate quantities, as performance on these subtraction tasks showed a Weber's Law signature, and was independent of conventional number knowledge.

Eighty‐three 12‐month‐old infants faced a noisy, active, object for one minute, after which the object turned 45 degrees to the left or the right. Five conditions explored what object features elicited gaze‐following behavior in the infants. In one condition, the object was an adult stranger. The other four conditions used a soft, brown, dog‐sized, amorphously‐shaped, asymmetrical novel object that varied along two dimensions theorized as central to the identification of intentional beings: facial features and contingently interactive behavior. Infants shifted their own attentional direction to match the orientation of the actor or object in every condition except the one in which the object lacked both a face and contingently interactive behavior. Infants''gaze'‐following behavior in general, therefore, appears to have been driven selectively by a particular configuration of behavioral and morphological characteristics, specifically those theorized as underlying attributions of intentionality rather than attributions of person per se.

AbstractAdult humans demonstrate differential processing of stimuli that were recurrent threats to safety and survival throughout evolutionary history. Recent studies suggest that differential processing of evolutionarily ancient threats occurs in human infants, leading to the proposal of an inborn mechanism for rapid identification of, and response to, evolutionary fear‐relevant stimuli. The current study provides novel data in support of this proposal, showing for the first time that human infants differentially process evolutionary threats presented in the auditory modality. Sixty‐one 9‐month‐olds listened to evolutionary fear‐relevant, modern fear‐relevant, and pleasant sounds, while their heart rate, startle, and visual orienting behaviours were measured. Infants demonstrated significantly enhanced heart rate deceleration, larger eye‐blinks, and more visual orienting when listening to evolutionary fear‐relevant sounds compared to sounds from the other two categories. These results support the proposal that human infants possess evolved mechanisms for the differential processing of a range of ancient environmental threats.

We report two studies designed to examine the role of conversational understanding in young children's scientific reasoning. The results indicate that performance can be influenced by the degree of specificity in questioning. Under nonspecific questioning, accurate reasoning was associated with both vocabulary comprehension and pragmatic ability whereas under specific questioning it was associated only with vocabulary comprehension. Findings are discussed in terms of the conversational knowledge that is required for success on measures of scientific reasoning.

AbstractTheory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via 'litmus' false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the 'Dot‐Midge task'). Ninety‐six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4‐year‐olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3‐year‐olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard 'Sally‐Ann' false belief test, the Dot‐Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally‐Ann task procedure) and a norm‐referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot‐Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally‐Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners' beliefs in the context of a competitive game.

AbstractThe influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth – and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition – is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016]Current Biology, 26, 1334–1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post‐hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017]Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal "imitation" predict later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object‐directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self‐recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal "imitation" of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, meanrs = 0.027, 95% CI [−0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjustedpvalues > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a "like me" mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.