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AbstractSmall-scale fisheries often operate under conditions of regulated open access; that is, the fishery is subject to natural or regulatory constraints on fishing technology, including regulations of fishing gear and fishing practices, but typically there is no direct regulation of catches. We study how an increase in harvesting efficiency changes the different components of welfare—consumer surplus and producer surplus—in such a regulated open-access fishery, taking t the feedback of harvesting on stock dynamics, i.e. the dynamic common-pool resource externality into account. We find that both components of welfare change in the same direction. If, and only if, initial efficiency is low enough so that there is no maximum sustainable yield (MSY) overfishing, an improvement of harvesting efficiency increases welfare.

ABSTRACTThe paper analyses the conflict between wildlife conservation and its accompanying land-use in an East African context. In the model there are two agents. First, there is an agency managing the wildlife and the habitat of the wildlife, which is referred to as parkland. On the other hand, there is the group of agro-pastoralists living in the vicinity of the wildlife habitat, whose land-use is referred to as rangelands. The parkland is used for tourism production and hunting, while the rangelands are used for agro-pastoral production. Both agents will find it beneficial to expand their land-use, so there is a land-use conflict. This is analysed in two steps. First, social optimality is studied; then we study the utilization of the wildlife and its accompanying land-use when there is no unified resource policy and the park agency follows its self-interest. The effects on the two different management schemes of changing economic conditions, such as the recommendations of the CITES convention and a programme subsidizing agro-pastoral production, are discussed.

ABSTRACTThe paper analyzes the conflict between illegal and legal exploitation of wildlife species in an East African context. In the model there are two agents, an agency managing a national park of fixed area and a group of local people living in the vicinity of the park. The park agency has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Because of the property rights, the park agency has incentives to invest in the stock of wildlife, while the behaviour of the local people is steered by short-term considerations. The model is analyzed in two steps. Firstly, the market solution is studied. Next, the model is examined when user and property rights are given to the local people.