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This paper examines the role of discriminatory policy tools in a model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific projects. In equilibrium, the ability to tactically target both jurisdictional specific projects, with benefits concentrated within a given jurisdiction, and the costs associated with those projects across multiple jurisdictions, leads to inefficiency in the provision of the "local" projects. In particular, politically motivated discrimination in the provision of local projects and/or their associated costs results in the foregoing of efficient projects. However, greater discriminatory ability in the set of available policies lowers the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects. ; Dieser Aufsatz untersucht in einem Modell umverteilender Politik die Rolle von lokalen öffentlichen Gütern und öffentlichen Projekten in einzelnen Jurisdiktionen. Politiker können aus strategischen Gründen bestimmte lokale Projekte durchführen und dadurch gezielt bestimmte Gebietskörperschaften beeinflussen, welche die Vorteile dieser Projekte genießen, während die damit verbundenen Kosten von mehreren Jurisdiktionen getragen werden. Dies führt zu einer Ineffizienz in der Durchführung solcher lokalen Projekte. Insbesondere führt eine politisch motivierte Ungleichbehandlung verschiedener Gebietskörperschaften bei der Durchführung lokaler Projekte bzw. ihrer Finanzierung dazu, dass manche effizienten Projekte nicht durchgeführt werden. Allerdings geht diese Ineffizienz zurück, wenn es größere Möglichkeiten zu ungleicher Behandlungen verschiedener Jurisdiktionen gibt.

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size.

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan "get-out-the-vote" efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan GOTV efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This article investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a hybrid strategy in which non-battleground states are stochastically targeted.

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size.