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This article examines persistent social impacts of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) by focusing on the relationship between social capital and chronic individual stress and collective trauma, using Hobfoll's (1988) conservation of resources model of stress as an organizing framework. Data are based on in‐depth personal interviews conducted 14 years after the disaster. Analyses focus on the ways in which stress‐related behaviors associated with loss and threat of loss of various forms of resources have affected social capital in the renewable resource community of Cordova, Alaska. Findings reveal lower levels of trust, disruptions in associations, weakened social connections and networks, altered social discourses, diminished feelings of good will, and violations of norms of reciprocity. Behaviors associated with long‐term stress related to the EVOS and to the associated protracted litigation are indicative of diminished social capital. This research highlights the critical importance of social capital as a collective resource and illustrates the ways in which decreased social capital can exacerbate individual stress and collective trauma.

Decades of social science research have taught us much about how individuals, groups, and communities respond to disasters. The findings of this research have helped inform emergency management practices, including disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, most of us—researchers or not—have attempted or are attempting to make sense of what is going on around us. In this article, we assert that we need not examine the pandemic in a vacuum; rather, we can draw upon scholarly and practical sources to inform our thinking about this 21st century catastrophe. The pandemic has provided an "unfortunate opportunity" to revisit what we know about disaster phenomena, including catastrophes, and to reconsider the findings of research from over the years. Drawing upon academic research, media sources, and our own observations, we focus on the U.S. and employ disaster characteristics framework of (1) etiology or origins; (2) physical damage characteristics; (3) disaster phases or cycles; (4) vulnerability; (5) community impacts; and (6) individual impacts to examine perspectives about the ways in which the ongoing pandemic is both similar and dissimilar to conceptualizations about the social dimensions of hazards and disasters. We find that the COVID-19 pandemic is not merely a disaster; rather, it is a catastrophe.

This article describes research designs utilized to study cumulative sociocultural and psychosocial effects of technological hazards and disasters. We apply these designs to two cases: (a) the Exxon Valdez disaster with a focus on Cordova, Alaska, and (b) the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline project with a focus on the Gitga'at First Nation in Hartley Bay, British Columbia, Canada. The Exxon Valdez oil spill began in 1989 with the grounding of the supertanker on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Fisheries collapsed, key species failed to recover, and litigation languished for 19 years, creating an accumulation of impacts from the initial event. The Gitga'at First Nation serves as a case for examining cumulative effects of energy development, specifically the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline project proposed in 2010. Hartley Bay's sociocultural and psychosocial well-being are under threat from these and other ongoing development activities; they have also endured centuries of government-led subjugation. In studying each of these communities, we used mixed methods approaches that combined document review, observations, interviews, and surveys. Based on our experiences, we contend that the most effective way to examine cumulative social impacts is to employ concepts and theories drawn from existing research to support guidelines, frameworks, and methods.

On December 8, 2004, the Selendang Ayu, a Malaysian‐flagged freighter, ran aground off Unalaska Island in Alaska's Aleutian chain. Despite rescue efforts by the United States Coast Guard, six of the Selendang Ayu's crew members died. In addition to the deaths, more than 300,000 gallons of heavy bulk fuel oil spilled into the sea. Much of the oil washed onto the island's shores, into areas providing cultural, recreational, subsistence, and commercial fishing resources for residents of the renewable resource community of Dutch Harbor/Unalaska. The purpose of this article is to identify and examine different dimensions of risk, based on qualitative research conducted in 2005. We use a contextual constructionist approach to understand risk, which conceptualizes risk as an objective hazard, threat, or danger that is mediated through social and cultural processes. Research methods included 31 personal interviews, participatory observation, and a review of media coverage. Findings revealed several dimensions of risk perceived by residents: the incident in relation to Dutch Harbor/Unalaska as a high‐risk community and more general current events; threats to the community's annual $1 billion seafood industry; threats to Alaska Native subsistence culture; and issues of future risk and uncertainty. Interviews and observations support our conclusion that the Selendang Ayu incident represented a "shot across the bow" that could have been a "worst case" if oil had contaminated commercial fish processing. Residents believe that it is only a matter of time before another, more damaging accident occurs. Given this general perception, it is important to more clearly assess risk in Dutch Harbor/Unalaska and help the community increase resilience to the multiple hazards it faces. More broadly, Dutch Harbor/Unalaska serves as an example—all communities could benefit from better risk assessments and increased attention to resiliency.

AbstractThe authors identify key issues for the improvement of evaluations of disaster and emergency management. The value of an interagency approach is discussed, as is the importance of the crossover lessons from international and domestic evaluation efforts. The authors discuss specific ways evaluation is tied to the larger context of guidelines and standards in humanitarian assistance. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc., and the American Evaluation Association.

AbstractThe authors offer a conceptual framework explicating how evaluation can enhance disaster and emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. The phases of preparedness, response, and recovery in any disaster situation are connected to who has responsibility for the evaluation and how the evaluation will be used. The complexity of the relationships among these diverse elements suggests that evaluation in this domain needs to be flexible and strategic to be beneficial. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc., and the American Evaluation Association.

In February of 2021, Winter Storm Uri affected parts of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Texas was particularly hard hit, as the state's primary power provider, ERCOT (the Electric Reliability Council of Texas), proved to be unprepared for the event—despite similar storms in 1989 and 2011 that revealed weaknesses in the state's electric grid system. This article investigates psychosocial outcomes of individuals who experienced Winter Storm Uri. Drawing upon survey data collected in Texas in April and May of 2022, we illustrate ways in which loss of critical infrastructure and compounding results influence levels of stress among respondents. Using Hofoll's (1989, 1991) Conservation of Resources model of stress, we find that Uri‐related losses of objects and conditions resources contribute to elevated stress as measured by the Avoidance subscale of the Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz 1976; Horowitz, Wilner, and Alvarez 1979)— more than one year after the disaster. Our regression model consisting of indicators of objects resource loss, conditions resource loss, and demographic characteristics explains approximately 33 percent of the variance in the Avoidance subscale. Findings suggest that more attention should be paid to the social impacts of critical infrastructure failures and that such impacts should be addressed by improving critical infrastructure policy and regulations, as well as the physical structures.

AbstractDuring the past four decades, a number of social science scholars have conceptualized technological disasters as a social problem. More specifically, research in this arena has identified individual and collective stress as a secondary trauma of processes intended to provide compensation and economic relief from disasters in general and, more specifically, technological disasters. Based on data from a 2013 household telephone survey of 1,216 residents of coastal Alabama, this article examines the relationship between psychosocial stress and compensation processes related to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We examine involvement with claims, settlement, and litigation activities; vulnerability and exposure to the spill; ties to resources; resource loss and gain; perceptions of risk and recreancy; and intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors as measured by the impact of event scale. Regression analysis reveals that the strongest contributors to intrusive stress were being part of the compensation process, resource loss, concerns about air quality, and income. Although being involved with compensation processes was a significant predictor of avoidance behaviors, the strongest contributors to avoidance behaviors were resource loss, air quality concern, income, being male, minority status, and community attachment. Beliefs that the compensation process was as distressing as the oil spill also significantly contributed to intrusive stress and avoidance behaviors. This research represents a step toward filling a gap in empirical evidence regarding the extent to which protracted compensation processes exacerbate adverse psychosocial impacts of disasters and hinder community recovery.