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Das beliebte und häufig eingesetzte Lehrbuch bietet eine umfassende und verständliche Einführung in alle wichtigen Grundlagen der psychologischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsmethodik. Auf die Bedürfnisse von Studierenden angepasst, werden Konzepte und Verfahren möglichst intuitiv und anhand zahlreicher einprägsamer Beispiele aus dem Forschungsalltag erklärt ohne dabei an Präzision einzubüßen. Eine klare Sprache und viele einprägsame Beispiele unterstützen den Lernprozess

Abstract: Background: A fact box is a promising tool for benefit-risk communication. This compact table summarizes the benefits and harms of a health-related intervention and compares the intervention to a control group. Although previous research has demonstrated that fact boxes are well understood, little is known about how they affect risk perceptions. Risk perception is particularly relevant to vaccination behavior. Aims: Two experiments investigated how different profiles of vaccine benefits and harms influence risk perceptions and the intention to vaccinate. Method: In Experiment 1, 430 participants were included in a 4 (benefits [vaccine effectiveness]) × 2 (harms [probability of vaccine adverse events]) between-subjects design. In Experiment 2, 541 participants were included in a 2 (benefits) × 2 (harms) × 2 (comprehension test conducted before or after assessment of risk perceptions) between-subjects design. Measures: Perceived risk of vaccination, intention to vaccinate, comprehension, and, in Experiment 2 only, perceived risk of non-vaccination. Results: Greater benefits decreased the perceived risk of vaccination and increased the intention to vaccinate. More harms increased the perceived risk of vaccination and, in Experiment 2 only, decreased the intention to vaccinate. More benefits increased the perceived risk of non-vaccination. Exploratory analyses showed that the comprehension and position of a comprehension test influenced risk perceptions. Limitations: The experiments used MTurk convenience samples and a fictitious disease. Conclusion: Communicating vaccine profiles in fact boxes affects risk perceptions. Additional measures may cue a deeper elaboration of the vaccine profile.

The RISK of an event generally relates to its expected severity and the perceived probability of its occurrence. In RISK research, however, there is no standard measure for subjective probability estimates. In this study, we compared five commonly used measurement formats—two rating scales, a visual analog scale, and two numeric measures—in terms of their ability to assess subjective probability judgments when objective probabilities are available. We varied the probabilities (low vs. moderate) and severity (low vs. high) of the events to be judged as well as the presentation mode of objective probabilities (sequential presentation of singular events vs. graphical presentation of aggregated information). We employed two complementary goodness‐of‐fit criteria: the correlation between objective and subjective probabilities (sensitivity), and the root mean square deviations of subjective probabilities from objective values (accuracy). The numeric formats generally outperformed all other measures. The severity of events had no effect on the performance. Generally, a rise in probability led to decreases in performance. This effect, however, depended on how the objective probabilities were encoded: pictographs ensured perfect information, which improved goodness of fit for all formats and diminished this negative effect on the performance. Differences in performance between scales are thus caused only in part by characteristics of the scales themselves—they also depend on the process of encoding. Consequently, researchers should take the source of probability information into account before selecting a measure.

AbstractThe study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.