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Geography and the dilemma of the left -- The long shadow of the industrial revolution -- From workers' parties to urban parties -- Urban form and voting -- What is wrong with the Pennsylvania Democrats? -- Weaker together : political geography and the representation of Democrats -- The battle for the soul of the left -- The road not taken : proportional representation -- The end of the dilemma?

In order to address classic questions about democratic representation, in countries with winner-take-all electoral districts, it is necessary to understand the distribution of political preferences across districts. Recent formal theory literature has contributed new insights into how parties choose platforms in countries with a continuum of heterogeneous districts. Meanwhile, increases in survey sample sizes and advances in empirical techniques have made it possible to characterize the distribution of preferences within and across electoral districts. This review addresses an emerging literature that builds on these new tools to explore the ways in which the geography of political preferences can help explain the parties that compete, the platforms and policies they choose, and even the rules under which they compete. Building on insights from economic and political geography, it pays special attention to electoral and policy biases that can emerge when there is an asymmetric distribution of preferences across districts. Adapted from the source document.

Why do some federations implement highly progressive intergovernmental transfer schemes while others do not? First, this essay establishes some stylized facts, using provincial-level data from nine federations to measure the extent of inter-regional redistribution achieved through intergovernmental transfers in each country. Second, it explores sources of institutional variation that might help account for these persistent cross-country differences, focusing on theories of legislative bargaining, representation, and the distribution of income across regions. Third, it examines the historical conditions under which the basic institutions of federalism were selected.

As authority over public expenditures has shifted from central to
provincial and local governments in countries around the world over
the last two decades, prevailing approaches to the study of
decentralization in welfare economics and public choice from the
1970s and 1980s have given way to new political economy approaches.
The first generation of theories envisioned central and lower-level
governments as distinct sovereigns within their own spheres of
activity. Recognizing a more complex reality, the political economy
literature is rethinking the notion of sovereignty in multi-tiered
systems. Motivated by recent difficulties with fiscal
decentralization and fiscal discipline, this essay rethinks the
notion of fiscal sovereignty, viewing it as an evolving set of
beliefs in the context of a dynamic game of incomplete information
played between central and subnational governments.
Provincial or local governments, along with their creditors and
voters, attempt to assess the credibility of the central
government's commitment to abide by pre-specified intergovernmental
fiscal arrangements. When higher-level governments dominate the
field of taxation and take on heavy co-financing obligations—as
central governments do in virtually all newly decentralizing
countries—the central government's commitment not to bail out
subnational governments in the event of debt-servicing crises is not
credible. In other words, subnational governments without
significant tax autonomy will not be viewed as sovereign borrowers,
and this has important implications for their fiscal behavior.

Following a look at the complex relationship between fiscal sovereignty (ie, tax autonomy) & decentralization, the basic notion of fiscal sovereignty in multitiered systems is reconsidered as an evolving set of beliefs in the context of central-subnational government relations. A basic theoretical framework views this relationship as a game of incomplete information wherein fiscal management in the multitiered system is problematized by disputed sovereignty over subnational debt. Without tax autonomy, subnational governments are not perceived as sovereign, which can have negative fiscal implications. Empirical predictions generated by this framework are then considered via a brief overview of some case studies. To consider why some subnational governments have emerged as sovereigns (eg, US states & Canadian provinces) while others have lost their authority (eg, German states & Argentine provinces), various arguments centering on regime type, civil war & other conflict, political parties, & interregional income inequality are considered. 11 References. J. Zendejas

AbstractThis article revisits the influential "Leviathan" hypothesis, which posits that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries. I use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries, attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation. First, I explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide-ranging authority to set the tax base and rate, especially on mobile assets. In countries where this is most clearly the case, decentralization is associated with smaller government. Second, consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from welfare economics and positive political economy, I show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers.