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The recent focus on impact evaluation within development economics has lead to increased pressure on aid agencies to provide "hard evidence", i.e. results from randomized controlled trials (RCTs), to motivate how they spend their money. In this paper I argue that even though RCTs can help us better understand if some interventions work or not, it can also reinforce an existing bias towards focusing on what generates quick, immediately verifiable and media-packaged results, at the expense of more long term and complex processes of learning and institutional development. This bias comes from a combination of public ignorance, simplistic media coverage and the temptation of politicians to play to the simplistic to gain political points and mitigate the risks of bad publicity. I formalize this idea in a simple principal-agent model with a government and an aid agency. The agency has two instruments to improve immediately verifiable outcomes; choose to spend more of the resources on operations rather than learning or select better projects/programs. I first show that if the government cares about long term development, then incentives will be moderated not to push the agency to neglect learning. If the government is impatient, though, then the optimal contract leads to stronger incentives, positively affecting the quality of projects/programs but also negatively affecting the allocation of resources across operations and learning. Finally, I show that in the presence of an impatient government, then the introduction of a better instrument for impact evaluation, such as RCTs, may actually decrease aid effectiveness by motivating the government to chose even stronger incentives.

AbstractWe look at the growth experience of 25 transition countries over the 25 years since the dissolution of the USSR. The initial collapse in income was much more severe in 12 former Soviet Union countries (FSU12) than in the 10 transition countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (EU10). In 2015, FSU12 income levels were further behind EU10 than they were at the start of transition, despite more rapid growth in the last 15 years. Compared to predictions from a parsimonious growth model, the region as a whole is 'normal' in terms of growth performance since the 2000s. However, the FSU12 over‐perform and the EU10 under‐perform relative to model predictions for the last 15 years.

AbstractThere has been relatively little investigation of the effect of constitutional transformations on the economic transition in post‐communist countries. We develop a simple signalling model in which constitutionalism – a commitment to limit political power and provide judicial defence of basic rights – reinforces the credibility of pro‐market candidates' electoral promises and boosts public support for economic reforms. These findings are tested using opinion poll data on public support for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s. In a two‐stage procedure we show that public support for market reforms is higher in countries where incumbents have taken deliberate steps to increase political accountability and judicial independence. Public support also spurs actual economic reform.