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War is often attributed to the fact that parties are unable to commit to an agreement, or have incentives to renege on it. This cause of war is known as "commitment problems". Yet commitment problems are not in themselves sufficient for war. Parties to a conflict can experience commitment problems and not go to war. Although current theories suggest conditions under which commitment problems should be more or less likely to cause war, these conditions are rarely empirically specified. The paper rectifies this important omission by empirically evaluating hypothesized scope conditions of commitment problems-driven war. Specifically, I analyze the effects of the extent to which power was redistributed prior to war; the speed with which power was redistributed; and the current and anticipated future relative capabilities of the parties. I compare a positive and a negative case of homeland military intervention in support of co-ethnics abroad, using evidence on homeland leaders' perceptions, reasoning and behavior. The evidence supports the hypotheses. Commitment problems cause military intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are large and rapid, and when their current military capabilities favor intervention. Commitment problems do not cause intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are small and incremental, and when their current military capabilities are poor.

When politically marginal ethnic groups have transnational ties to co-ethnics in civil conflicts, the countries in which the marginal groups reside are more likely to intervene. Marginal-to-marginal group ties and marginal-to-dominant group ties between a group in a third-party country and actors in civil conflict increase the likelihood of military intervention. Familiar forms of ethnic ties such as politically dominant-to-marginal group ties and dominant-to-dominant group ties are merely special cases of ethnic ties between any group in a third-party country and co-ethnics in civil conflict. The article also presents evidence suggesting that ethnic ties affect how intervening countries take sides. Interveners tend to favour the government in civil conflicts when marginal groups in both countries have ethnic ties. Likewise, ties between two dominant groups are associated with government-biased interventions. In contrast, intervening countries whose dominant group has ties to a marginal group in civil conflict tend to favour the opposition. Overall, the results testify to the importance of including politically marginal groups' ethnic ties when explaining how third-party countries behave. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

When politically marginal ethnic groups have transnational ties to co-ethnics in civil conflicts, the countries in which the marginal groups reside are more likely to intervene. Marginal-to-marginal group ties and marginal-to-dominant group ties between a group in a third-party country and actors in civil conflict increase the likelihood of military intervention. Familiar forms of ethnic ties such as politically dominant-to-marginal group ties and dominant-to-dominant group ties are merely special cases of ethnic ties between any group in a third-party country and co-ethnics in civil conflict. The article also presents evidence suggesting that ethnic ties affect how intervening countries take sides. Interveners tend to favour the government in civil conflicts when marginal groups in both countries have ethnic ties. Likewise, ties between two dominant groups are associated with government-biased interventions. In contrast, intervening countries whose dominant group has ties to a marginal group in civil conflict tend to favour the opposition. Overall, the results testify to the importance of including politically marginal groups' ethnic ties when explaining how third-party countries behave.