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The dominant interpretation of the Glorious Revolution portrays it as an innovative compromise that used clever institutional design to solve a coordination problem between rival elites. In contrast, I argue that it was neither innovative nor a compromise and that it was the product of structural change rather than institutional design. Following Barrington Moore, I focus on the rise of agrarian capitalism and economically autonomous elites, who, in contrast to rent-seeking elites, do not depend on favor from the state for their income. They have an interest in the creation of a political system that ensures their equal rights under the law, open access to markets, and opportunities to form broad coalitions against rent-seeking. This makes them a critical constituency for representative government. I test this argument through an analysis of patterns of allegiance for Crown and Parliament at the outset of the English Civil War and address its relevance to the Glorious Revolution.

Both Gideon Rose's neoclassical realism and Andrew Moravcsik's liberalism attempt to solve the problem of how to incorporate domestic factors into international relations theory. They do so in very different ways, however. Liberalism is a "bottom-up" perspective that accords analytic priority to societal preferences; neoclassical realism is a "top-down" perspective that accords analytic priority to systemic pressures and treats domestic factors as intervening variables. These two approaches are not equivalent, and the choice between them has high stakes. Although it has gained rapidly in popularity, neoclassical realism is fundamentally flawed. Its intellectual justification is weak; it is logically incoherent; and it induces the commission of methodological errors. Realism can incorporate certain domestic factors without losing its theoretical integrity, but it does not need and should not use neoclassical realism to do so.

"American Grand Strategy and Political Economy Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

For the past three centuries, Great Britain and the United States have stood in succession at the apex of the international hierarchy of power. They have been on the winning side of every systemic conflict in this period, from the War of the Spanish Succession to the Cold War. As a result, they have been able to influence the political and economic development of states around the world. In many of their colonies, conquests, and clients, they have propagated ideals and institutions conducive to democratization. At the same time, they have defeated numerous rivals whose success would have had ruinous consequences for democracy. The global spread of democracy, therefore, has been endogenous to the game of great power politics.

For the past three centuries, Great Britain and the United States have stood in succession at the apex of the international hierarchy of power. They have been on the winning side of every systemic conflict in this period, from the War of the Spanish Succession to the Cold War. As a result, they have been able to influence the political and economic development of states around the world. In many of their colonies, conquests, and clients, they have propagated ideals and institutions conducive to democratization. At the same time, they have defeated numerous rivals whose success would have had ruinous consequences for democracy. The global spread of democracy, therefore, has been endogenous to the game of great power politics. (World Politics / SWP)

A major rearmament program can have a lasting effect on the balance of political and economic power between societal groups. It will typically require the expansion of progressive taxation and government interference in the economy, both of which are disproportionately harmful to the interests of the upper classes. Consequently, conservative governments that face a sharp increase in international threat should be more likely than their leftist counterparts to try to substitute alliances and appeasement for arms. I test this hypothesis on Great Britain in 1895-1905, 1907-14, and 1931-39, France in 1904-14 and 1935-39, and the United States in 1938-41, 1948-60, and 1979-86. In all but one of these cases, I find that leftist governments did more to strengthen their countries' militaries than conservatives. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

A review essay on books by (1) Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, & Edward Rhodes (Eds), The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests (New York: Columbia U Press, 1999; & (2) Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1998). The essays in the collection edited by Trubowitz, Goldman, & Rhodes adopt a liberal perspective on strategic adjustment as a response to "an ambiguous international environment & profound domestic political struggles over the allocation of resources" in US society. Focus is on the development of the US Navy from the late 19th century, identifying a cultural-cognitive structural-process, & political economy factors that shaped US political culture & prompted naval reform & expansion. Trubowitz's book expands the political economy interpretation of strategic adjustment, focusing on the dramatic shifts in US foreign & security policy during the 1930s & 1980s. Though his work is deemed a "seminal contribution to international relations scholarship," it fails to mount an adequate challenge to the dominant realist paradigm; suggestions are offered for strengthening his political economy perspective to provide a viable alternative to realism. K. Hyatt Stewart