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California's Top Two Primary in 2012 gave voters the chance to cross party lines to vote for the candidate of their choice in what was the equivalent of a two-stage election with run-off. The top two vote getters in each race, independent of party, proceeded to the general election. Using a panel survey design I examine the behavior of voters under this system at both the primary (first) stage and general election (second) stage. I estimate how many voters chose to cross party lines, and how many did so for strategic reasons. I then examine how voters behaved when faced with different scenarios in the general election regarding the availability of their preferred candidate, or any candidate representing their party. I find that surprisingly few voters crossed party lines, and relatively few who did so did so for strategic reasons. If such low levels of crossover continue, the impact of the top two primary on candidate ideology will likely be small. At the general election stage, voters who were faced with two candidates of the opposing party often chose to simply abstain from such races at a high rate.

Replication of scholarly analysis depends on individual researchers being able to explain exactly what they have done. And being able to explain exactly what one has done requires keeping good records of it. This article describes basic good computing practices and offers advice for writing clear code that facilitates the task of replicating the research. The goals are simple. First, the researcher should be able to replicate his or her own work six hours later, six months later, and even six years later.

I show that restrictive registration laws do not dissuade individuals with lower levels of education from voting any more than individuals with higher levels of education. This finding contradicts the result reported in Wolfinger and Rosenstone's classic analysis of turnout. I show that their conclusion was actually an artifact of the methodology they employed. Examining predicted probabilities generated by a nonlinear model such as probit or logit may produce spurious results when used to determine interactive effects between two independent variables. By respecifying the model of turnout to explicitly include terms to test interactive hypotheses and reanalyzing the data from the 1972 Current Population Survey (as well as data from the 1984 survey), I show that in fact, no such substantive interactive effect between registration laws and individuals' level of education exists at the micro level.

A random sample of students (N = 472) from the California Instit of Technology were surveyed by mail questionnaire in an investigation of the connection between individuals' level of information, attitudes, & opinions on specific policies. It is shown that the effect of information on opinion is mediated by relative disagreement of information with existing attitudes. Respondents (Rs) who were predisposed to oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) based on their attitudes toward defense became more opposed to SDI if they had higher levels of information, while Rs predisposed to favor SDI actually increased their support given more information. 4 Tables, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

Deference to committees and committee obstruction are two frequently cited phenomena of the U.S. Congress. Even in the postreform Congress, standing committees exert disproportionate influence on legislation. Shepsle and Weingast have put forth an institutional explanation for these phenomena: the ex-post veto that standing committees enjoy via the conference procedure. They argue that it is pointless for the House to drastically modify a standing committee's bill on the floor in a way that the committee disapproves of, or discharge a committee of a bill, because committees can veto legislation by refusing to come to agreement in conference. In this article I examine the procedure used by the House to select conferees, and describe the implications of this process for legislative outcomes. In doing this I suitably modify the Shepsle/ Weingast theory to fit the current rules of the House and significantly alter the implications of the theory for committee influence. I show that committee influence depends upon the behavior of the Speaker of the House and suggest that the Speaker's behavior (and hence committee influence) is determined by the preferences of the members of the majority party on the floor. I then analyze the debate over minimum wage legislation in the House of Representatives during 1972, 1973, and 1977 in the context of the theory developed.