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Scholars of autocracies increasingly debate whether autocratic regimes promote their subordinates based on achievements, such as economic performance, and further a meritocratic system. This article argues that the extent to which autocratic regimes reward economic performance is not
constant over the course of an autocratic regime's lifespan but varies depending on the strategic goals of the regime and the regime's ability to monitor its subordinates' performance. We collect a new dataset on the careers of the regional leaders of the German Nazi Party, the Gauleiters,
from 1936 to 1944, and a wealth of historical data sources from the regime. Using this, we show that better regional economic performance increased the chance of receiving a promotion before the outbreak of World War II but not after.

Who governs? This is one of the most fundamental questions in political science. Despite its importance, there is currently no global dataset on governing elites over a long period. This article presents a novel dataset, WhoGov, which contains yearly data on members of cabinets in 177 countries during the period 1966–2016, making it the largest of its kind. We first present how the dataset was created and validate it by matching this data against existing data. We then demonstrate how the data can be used to gain new insights into diverse fields such as the study of autocracies, gender studies, the study of regime types, and government formation. We expect that this dataset will be an invaluable resource for both comparativists and country experts.

AbstractWhy are women under‐represented even in democratic and egalitarian countries? Previous research considers either demand‐side or supply‐side explanations. We integrate both perspectives in a least‐likely case for the under‐representation of women, namely the municipal councils in Denmark. The data stems from a candidate choice conjoint experiment, a survey among potential candidates, and data on the actual pool of nominated candidates. On the voter demand‐side, we show that there is no pro‐male bias in general or in combination with other candidate traits nor that traits evaluated positively by voters appear more frequently among actual male candidates. On the supply‐side, we find that women are less likely to be interested in running for political office. This is primarily because women assess their own political qualifications significantly lower than men. The under‐supply of female candidates seem to drive the disparity suggesting that we should focus more on supply‐side factors to overcome the gender imbalance.

Though governments historically have been a men's club, women are increasingly gaining access. We argue that democratic institutions are important drivers of women's inclusion in government. This stems from the rationales of autocratic versus democratic leaders when selecting ministers. Autocrats fear a coup by inner-circle elites, who are mostly men, incentivizing them to assign ministerial positions as co-optation. In contrast, democratic leaders are accountable to the citizenry through elections and must satisfy increasing demands for gender equality. Furthermore, we argue that it is historical experience with democracy that matters, rather than the level, as it takes time to create an even playing field, change attitudes, and generate trust in democracy. To support this, we contribute with the first study using the most comprehensive dataset, WhoGov, on women's access to cabinets. Overall, we show that democracy is a process that gradually enables women to enter the highest echelons of power.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an attack on democracy, human rights, and the international order. While European democracies have supported their war-torn partner, Russia has sought to undermine public support by stopping its gas supply and imposing economic costs on European citizens. In consequence, Europeans find themselves caught between economic self-interest and principles. We present a theoretical argument and test how corresponding arguments for and against continued backing of Ukraine affect citizens' support using experimental and observational data collected while concerns with gas shortage and inflation mounted in Germany and Denmark. We find that support for Ukraine does not falter due to economic concerns. In contrast, citizens become more supportive when presented with arguments related to human rights, democracy, and respect for territorial boundaries. We discuss implications for understanding citizens' responses to autocratic power strategies and how support likely depends on the type of partner and domestic elite rhetoric.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens' behavior. One widely used tool for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens' behavior. One widely used tool for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias.

Populist parties, particularly from the right of the political spectrum, have sharply increased their electoral support in recent years, creating great media and scholarly interest. Existing work examining the economic underpinnings of populist support has focused on labor market shocks and the presence or absence of government compensation. In this paper we suggest that the housing market may have been as important as the labor market in defining who switched to populist voting and where they were located. We build on existing work that connects house prices to 'first dimension politics' of redistribution and classic left-right political identification to argue that house prices might also shape preferences on the 'second dimension' of politics: support for populist nationalism versus liberal cosmopolitanism. Using both novel precinctand individual-level data from Denmark, we show that negative shocks to house prices over the election cycle are strongly associated with shifts to support for the Danish People's Party, a pattern that has amplified over recent elections. We then turn to corroborate this relationship using local housing data in Sweden, Norway, and Finland.