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"'The revolutions of 1989' remains the standard term used to describe the onset of post-commununist transformations more than thirty years ago. Zenonas Norkus proposes a completely new perspective, theorising them as the next wave of modern social restorations, starting with the post-Napoleonic restorations in 1815. A comparison of the 1789 French and 1917 Russian revolutions was seminal for the rise of comparative historical and sociological research on modern revolutions. The book extends and supplements the sociology of modern revolutions by the first systematic outline of the sociology of modern social restorations grounded in a comparison of post-Napoleonic and post-communist restorations"--

This book provides a survey of the economic, health, and somatic progress of Baltic countries during the period 1918-2018, framed by the outline of the historical-sociological theory of modern social restorations, as originally conceived by the Austrian-American comparative historian Robert A. Kann. The author reworks Kann's theory to analyse post-communist transformations in the Baltic region. The book argues that the purpose of modern social restorations is to make restoration societies safe against a recurrence of revolution. There were two waves of modern social restorations: post-Napoleonic and post-communist. Most post-Napoleonic restorations were brief, because they failed to economically and socially outperform the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary systems. It considers Baltic restorations as laboratory cases of second-wave modern social restorations, because they encompass a triple restoration of the nation-state, capitalism, and democracy. The book assesses the performance success of Baltic restorations by comparing economic and social progress of Baltic countries during the periods of original independence (1918-1940), foreign-imposed state socialism (1940-1990), and restored independence (since 1990). It then elaborates the criteria to assess the ultimate performance success of these restorations by 2040, when restored Baltic states may endure longer than their ancestors in 1918-1940 and the complete foreign occupations era (1940-1990). The author, an expert in historical sociology, uses extensive historical-statistical data in cross-time comparisons to develop his analysis and create future projections. This book is of wide interest to sociologists, social demographers, political scientists, and economists studying the Baltic region.

Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Introduction -- Part I . Patterns of Post -Communist Transformation -- Chapter 1. The Concept of Post-Communist Transformation -- 1.1. What Was Communism? -- 1.2. The Concept of the Exit from Communism -- 1.3. Conceptual Foundations of the Typology of Paths of Post-Communist Transformation -- Chapter 2. Orientations and Modes of Post-Communist Transformation -- 2.1. Orientations of the Exit from Communism: Concepts and Cases -- 2.2. Economic Modes of the Exit from Communism: Concepts and Cases -- 2.3. Political Modes of the Exit from Communism: Concepts and Cases -- Chapter 3. Economic and Political Outcomesof Post-Communist Transformation -- 3.1. Change and Diversity of Capitalismin the Comparative Economic Sociology and Political Economy -- 3.2. Rational Entrepreneurial Capitalism in the Post-Communist World -- 3.3. Political Oligarchic and State Capitalismin the Post-Communist World -- 3.4. Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Their Adjectives:Outcomes of Political Transformation -- Chapter 4. Pathways and Patterns of Post-Communist Transformation -- 4.1. Comparative Qualitative Analysis as a Method of Theory Building -- 4.2. From Empirically Observed to Counterfactual Waysof Post-Communist Transformation -- 4.3. All Ways of Post-Communist Transformation -- Part I I . Capitalism and Democracy in Post -CommunistLithuania : Deepening Comparative Contexts -- Chapter 5. Why Lithuania "Lagged" Behind Estonia? -- 5.1. A North-South Gap in the Post-Communist Transformationof the Baltic States as a Problem of Explanation -- 5.2. An Economic Explanation of Lithuania's Falling Back -- 5.3. A Political-Economic Explanation:Does the Blame Lay on Lithuanian Ex-Communists? -- 5.4. A Culturalist Explanation: "Weber's Thesis" for the Baltic Countries?.

Sharp opposition between revolution as a positively valued and dominant term and restoration as its subordinated complement, loaded with negative meaning, is one of the legacies of the 1789 French Revolution. This may be the main reason why social restorations still are neglected in the philosophy of history and historical sociology, although both types of modern revolutions (French 1789 or "bourgeois" and Russian 1917 or "socialist") did end with restorations. This paper proposes revisions to only attempt at the theory of social restorations (by Austrian American comparativist Robert Kann (1906-1981) to make it applicable to post-communist restorations. They include the distinction between type and token restorations, endurance and performance success of restorations, and a new formulation of the criterion of endurance success.

This paper discusses recent quantitative research on defence spending in interwar Lithuania, and providesa comparison between the burden of defence spending in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland andPoland in 1924, 1938 and 1939, which are the only years with available data on the total expenditure inLithuania. Although contemporary mainstream economic science does not consider the military sectoras unproductive (it 'produces' security services), it still sees it as a burden to the economy, becausedefence spending decreases private consumption, along with private and public civil investment. Twoindicators of this burden are discussed: the share of defence spending in total state spending, and theratio of defence spending to gross national income (GNI) or gross domestic product (GDP). In recentresearch on defence spending in interwar Lithuania, only the size and changes in nominal expenditurehave so far been measured, without taking into consideration changes in the purchasing power of thelitas. The main findings of the application of the second indicator include the fact that among the Balticcountries (including Finland), the Latvian economy was most heavily burdened by defence spending in1924–1925. On the eve of the Second World War, however, Lithuania became the leader.Key words: defence economics, defence spending burden, share of defence expenditure in the statebudget, ratio of defence expenditure to total output, comparison of defence spending burdens.

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AbstractThis paper contributes to the body of research on the monetary variety of nationalism, which conceives of national currency as an essential element of nation state and national identity ('one nation, one money'), exploring its contribution to the successful internal devaluation in the Baltic states during the economic crisis of 2008–2010. Contrary to the predictions of renowned experts in economics and finance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were able to keep the peg of their national currencies to euro. Because of peculiar features of their histories (a brief period of independence with national currencies allegedly based on a gold standard, interrupted by prolonged Soviet occupation and the despised 'wooden rouble') monetary nationalism was very strong in the restored independent Baltic states. Monetary nationalism predisposed their indigenous populations to embrace the neoliberal model of capitalism and to accept the welfare cost of the defence of currency pegging during the crisis. Paradoxically, the success was self‐defeating, as it enabled the Baltic states to join Eurozone, abolishing national currencies. Theorizing about this case study of Baltic monetary nationalism, this paper closes with the interpretation of the rise and demise of national currencies as the reversal of the Weberian disenchantment process. Monetary nationalism (making money a core part of national identity) is a product of this reversal.

Vidutinė gyvenimo trukmė (VTGT, arba e°x) šiuo metu laikoma vienu iš patikimiausių gerovės rodiklių, naudojamų jos tarptautiniams skirtumams ir pokyčiams per tam tikrą laiką palyginti. Pirmos išsamios mirtingumo lentelės, reikalingos vidutinei tikėtinai gyvenimo trukmei (VTGT) apskaičiuoti, Lietuvoje buvo išleistos (vien "tarnybiniam naudojimui") tik 1963 m. ir apėmė 1958–1959 m. laikotarpį. Nuo praėjusio amžiaus aštuntojo dešimtmečio išsiplėtė osteologine medžiaga pagrįsti senovės Lietuvos gyventojų paleodemografiniai tyrimai. Šiuo metu apie Lietuvos gyventojų VTGT viduriniajame geležies amžiuje (V–VII a. po Kr.) ir vėlyvaisiais viduramžiais žinome daugiau negu XX amžiuje (iki 1958–1959 m.), nes tėra vienas šio laikotarpio VTGT skaičiavimas, kurį 1966 m. apgintoje disertacijoje pateikė Antanas Merčaitis: 1925–1926 m.visų Lietuvos gyventojų e°0 = 50, 25 metų (vyrų – 48,58; moterų – 51,89). Naudojant kitokį metodą, straipsnyje pateikiami nauji VTGT Lietuvoje 1925 m. ir 1932 m. skaičiavimai (mirtingumo lentelės), rodantys per šį laikotarpį vykusią gerovės pažangą. 1925 m. visų Lietuvos gyventojųe°0 = 48,72 metai (vyrų – 47,12; moterų – 50,27). 1932 m. VTGT padidėjo iki e°0 = 52,07 metų visų gyventojų, 50,43 vyrų ir 53,62 moterų. Straipsnis baigiamas VTGT Lietuvoje ir kitose tarpukario Europos šalyse palyginimu.