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Azerbaijan is the only country in the post-Soviet space where shiism is dominant and most Muslims are shiits. During the three decades of independent national development relations between the state and religion passed through 3 stages. As a result Azerbaijan lives now in conditions of symphony between the state and religion which may be preserved in the near perspective.

Politically and economically Kyrgyzstan still remains unstable. Yet the forces led by the current president S.Japarov who came to power in 2020 have managed to retain control over the state even though they failed to finalize a clear domestic political strategic and tactical course. In the last year they partially succeded in removing from power those who were associated in 2011-2020 with the rule of A. Atambayev–S.Jeenbekov, but no radical improvement in the domesic economic situation and in life conditions of population have been achieved. Still elections to Jogorku Kenesh in November 2021 showed that president Japarov has proved his political viability that will help him to formulate prospects of further national development.

Religious security became one of the important spheres in internal and external political affairs of the post-Soviet Muslim countries during 30 years of their independent development. Each of these states, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, gained their own experience in solving problems of religious security which however had many common features and methods of fighting religious extremism and radicalism. As a result it allowed the above countries to form cooperation in this field during the last decade and to undertake a lot of common practical and legal interstate steps in order to provide their religious security.

It is clear that the presence of an Islamic factor in WWW has become an objective reality, including in the post-Soviet Muslim countries. It could be determined as a Cyber-Islamic Environment (CIE). In the post-Soviet space the CIE is represented mostly by official Islamic structures, while the presence of unofficial religious organizations and individual preachers is more limited. Nevertheless the influence of the non-official CIE is significant and is capable to be converted into one of the mechanisms of social protests and revolutionary activities in post-Soviet Muslim countries in case of emergence of critical situations. It is clear that state authorities will accelerate control over the CIE in the coming years using various instruments against religious radicalism and extremism in WWW.