Search results

Front Cover -- Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Section 1: Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview -- Chapter 1: Dishonesty in behavioral economics: An overview -- 1 . Introduction -- 2 . Dishonesty among children and young adults -- 3 . Dishonesty, individual, and social preferences -- 4 . Dishonesty in daily life -- 5 . Further topics on dishonesty in behavioral economics -- 6 . Concluding remarks -- References -- Section 2: Dishonesty among children and young adults -- Chapter 2.1: Dishonesty in young children -- 1 Common experimental approaches in developmental psychology -- 2 Social and cognitive influences -- 3 Dishonesty that can benefit others -- 4 Dishonesty and distrust -- 5 Future directions -- 6 Summary -- References -- Chapter 2.2: Dishonesty among children: Rural/urban status and parental migration -- 1 . Introduction -- 2 . Related literature on moral development in children -- 3 . Experimental design and procedure -- 3.1 Subject pool and procedure -- 3.2 Key measure of cheating vs honesty -- 4 . Results -- 4.1 Data overview and demographic differences across treatment groups -- 4.2 Key results concerning dishonesty -- 5 . Conclusions and discussion -- Appendix: Experimental instructions and postexperiment questionnaire -- A.1 Instructions and script -- A.2 Compass game -- A.2.1 Comprehension check -- A.3 Smarties game -- A.3.1 Comprehension check -- A.4 Postexperiment questionnaire -- References -- Chapter 2.3: What does a young cheater look like? An innovative approach -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Experimental framework -- 3. Analysis -- 3.1 Linear analysis -- 3.2 Nonlinear analysis -- 4 Conclusion -- Appendix. Questionnaire -- References -- Chapter 2.4: Dishonesty among university students -- 1 . Introduction and related literature.

We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts.

We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts.

Women are less likely to enroll in selective or scientific courses, applying for promotions and are particularly underrepresented in both middle and top positions in the STEM field. Quota are often advocated as an instrument to reduce this gender gap, but it remains unclear at what step of the career ladder they more effectively foster women's reaching the top. Many factors may affect quota's success or failure, such as how they would in turn affect teamwork and trust between members within organizations or coordination in applying for promotions. In this paper, by means of a laboratory experiment implementing a two-stage tournament, we evaluate the impact of three different interventions in affecting individual decision to climb the career ladder, abstracting away from other possible confounding factors. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced in the initial stage of competition was ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top; quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or at both stages increased women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners. ; Women are less likely to enroll in selective or scientific courses, applying for promotions and are particularly underrepresented in both middle and top positions in the STEM field. Quota are often advocated as an instrument to reduce this gender gap, but it remains unclear at what step of the career ladder they more effectively foster women's reaching the top. Many factors may affect quota's success or failure, such as how they would in turn affect teamwork and trust between members within organizations or coordination in applying for promotions. In this paper, by means of a laboratory experiment implementing a two-stage tournament, we evaluate the impact of three different interventions in affecting individual decision to climb the career ladder, abstracting away from other possible confounding factors. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced in the initial stage of competition was ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top; quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or at both stages increased women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.

We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert effort in a task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion.

Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.

Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.

Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.

Payment and checkout at retail stores is increasingly being replaced by automated systems. One recent technological invention in this area is mobile self-scanning in which customers carry a mobile scanner while shopping. Mobile self-scanners give real-time feedback on spending. The device increases price saliency and enables customers to keep track of the total amount spent. Using a field experiment, we test if mobile self-scanning affects shopping behavior. Consumers of two grocery stores were allocated randomly to use a mobile self-scanner or not. Overall, we find that using the self-scanner has a negative but insignificant effect on total amount spent. However, the response to using the scanner is heterogeneous and for customers with low self-control, it significantly reduces both their spending and number of items bought when using the mobile scanner. Moreover, we find that consumers with low self-control are more likely to use the self-scanner than individuals with high self-control. Taken together, our results suggest that sophisticated individuals, that is, individuals who are aware of their self-control problem, use the scanner to control their spending.

Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.