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The BTWC has been portrayed as multilateralism as it should be: flexible, responsive, creative and dynamic; and above all, focused on overcoming obstacles and delivering results. It is still relevant and has been moulded to the contemporary needs of the states parties. There is no reason why the convention should not continue to be modified to keep pace with both political realities and advances in science and technology. Adapted from the source document.

"Implementation of the obligations of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has lagged seriously behind other disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Without an international organization to shoulder the burden, states have been left alone to establish ad hoc national arrangements. The two most recent work programmes within the BWC framework have helped to harmonize national approaches and focused on building capacity to translate international obligations into effective national action. States have begun to identify common ground in their approaches, to learn from each other's experiences and create a community of actors dedicated to ensuring that the life sciences are not used to cause deliberate harm. Over the last decade it has become increasingly clear that effective action will require a concerted effort from all those who can play a role in ensuring that the life sciences continue to be used safely, securely and solely for beneficial purposes. This book gathers together many of the best contributions from the recent work within the BWC framework and provides expert reviews of key themes, case studies of interesting national approaches, as well as unique perspectives from the ground. It is a practical tool for implementing the convention, an introductory guide to current best practice at the health/security interface and adds to the historical record of this important international instrument."--P. [4] of cover

AbstractWith the advance of biotechnology, biological information, rather than biological materials, is increasingly the object of principal security concern. We argue that both in theory and in practice, existing security approaches in biology are poorly suited to manage hazardous biological information, and use the cases of Mousepox, H5N1 gain of function, and Botulinum toxin H to highlight these ongoing challenges. We suggest that mitigation of these hazards can be improved if one can: (1) anticipate hazard potential before scientific work is performed; (2) consider how much the new information would likely help both good and bad actors; and (3) aim to disclose information in the manner that maximally disadvantages bad actors versus good ones.