Search results

The fertility transition experiences of many countries in Asia have been very slow and stalling. Yet, Iranian fertility rates have shown signs of sharp decline. The recent censuses and surveys, both regional and national, all are consistent with a strong declining trend which started in the later part of 1980s and seem to be continuing into the new century. The Demographic and Health Survey of Iran shows below replacement level fertility for urban areas and a very low fertility level for rural areas. A trend analysis of fertility levels suggests an unprecedented pace of fertility transition for Iran. Following Casterline (2001) we attempt to theorize about the cause of fast paced fertility transition. We conclude that the strong emerging economic aspirations among all families in all classes and communities, the high actual and perceptual level of child survival, and very low social and economic cost of birth control have been behind the speed of fertility transition in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We submit that the high economic aspirations of families will not only continue but will shift to higher levels among all classes and especially among the generations entering marriage in the coming years. The strong economic aspiration will curtail their desire for more than one child once they are married. Hence a strong public family planning program must continue to provide birth control supplies and services with low social and economic cost. Any effort to reduce the public support of family planning program will result in socially undesirable consequences such as an increase in abortion.

In order to find out the degree to which a father's education can be used as a predictor of the socioeconomic status (SES) of the family, 1,047 high school students in and around Shiraz, Iran were given a questionnaire covering a wide variety of issues. A considerable variation was found in the physical, cultural, and financial milieus of subjects with different FEs (father's education). Results indicate a close association between a father's education and his occupational status and income. Subjects with better‐educated fathers have reported a higher rate of literacy among their mothers and a more culturally enriched home environment than those with less‐educated fathers. The parental homes of the high FE group also appear to be mostly located in the more fashionable, modern residential areas of the city and to contain a larger number of rooms. The findings are taken as further justification for the use of FE as an index of parental SES. The significance of education as a means of social mobility in the Iranian culture is briefly discussed and the implication of this for the educational system of the country is commented upon.

Since its revival in 1989, the reproductive health and family planning program of Iran has made great strides in raising the contraceptive prevalence rate and reducing fertility. The majority of couples are using modern methods promoted and provided by the national program, although a sizable proportion of couples continue to depend on the traditional method of withdrawal. The longstanding urban–rural gap in contraceptive prevalence rates has been reduced to about 10 percent, which is mainly the result of better‐educated urban couples' continued practice of withdrawal. Despite its enormous success in meeting the needs of married couples, in narrowing the urban–rural gap in access to and use of modern contraceptives, and in reducing fertility, the Iranian family planning program is open to criticism for confining its target audience to married couples and failing to address the issue of abortion. The restrictive aspects of the program are often justified on the grounds of religious values and fear of encouraging sexual promiscuity. Because of the theocratic nature of the political system and the immense power enjoyed by Shiite ulama (religious leaders), no step can be taken to address these restrictions without their implicit support and approval. This study describes some of the ethical issues facing the reproductive health program of Iran and indicates how pragmatic approaches adopted by the ruling Shiite ulama to solve some of the social and medical challenges of a rapidly modernizing society may be extended to overcome ethical hurdles faced by the reproductive health program.