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The popular scholarly exercise of evaluating exchange rate forecasting models relative to a random walk was stimulated by the well-cited Meese and Rogoff (1983) paper. Practitioners who construct quantitative models for trading exchange rates approach forecasting from a different perspective. Rather than focus on forecast errors for bilateral exchange rates, as in the Meese-Rogoff case, we present what is required for constructing a successful trading model. To provide more perspective, a particular approach to quantitative modeling is presented that incorporates return forecasts, a risk model, and a transaction cost constraint in an optimization framework. Since beating a random walk is not a useful evaluation metric for currency investing, we discuss the use of benchmarks and conclude that performance evaluation in currencies is much more problematic than in equity markets due to the lack of a passive investment strategy and the multitude of alternative formulations of well-known currency style factors. We then provide analytical tools that can be useful in evaluating currency manager skill in terms of portfolio tilts and timing. Finally, we examine how conditioning information can be employed to enhance timing skill in trading generic styles like the carry trade. Such information can be valuable in reducing the duration and magnitude of portfolio drawdowns.

This paper describes and analyzes the implementation of a crawling exchange rate band on an electronic trading platform. The placement of limit orders at the central bank's target rate serves as a credible policy statement that may coordinate beliefs of market participants. We find for our sample that intervention increases exchange rate volatility (and spread) for the next minutes but that intervention days show a lower degree of volatility (and spread) than non-intervention days. We also show for intraday data that the price impact of interbank order flow is smaller on intervention days than on non-intervention days. These stabilizing effects, however, rely on the conditions of large currency reserves and the existence of capital controls; an electronic market seems to support this goal.

The financial crisis was followed by a period of extraordinary monetary policy easing. This period of quantitative easing and zero interest rate policies had significant effects on financial markets and created a global investment environment dominated by a single global factor of central bank policy. Looking forward, "normal" markets should include: (i) higher interest rates, but lower in the steady‐state than pre‐crisis; (ii) greater cross‐country interest differentials; and (iii) lower cross‐asset return correlations. In this environment, idiosyncratic macroeconomic differences across countries matter more than a "risk on/off" global factor that dominated in the post‐crisis era so that the opportunity set for global macro investors should be better than it has been in the 10 years since the crisis. The future investment environment will not be simply that of the pre‐crisis era but will reflect the evolution of the world economy. No single country in this evolution is more important than China and the changes ahead in China will create both risks and opportunities for investors.

AbstractGlobal markets since late 2007 are not 'normal', where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the 'new‐old normal' and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the 'new‐new normal'. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the 'new‐old normal' with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the 'new‐new normal' with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.