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While Turkey's use of public monies has been frequently marred by waste and short-term electoral rewarding, recent research suggests that the allocation of public investment across Turkish provinces between 2004 and 2012 was more responsive to socioeconomic needs than electoral politics. The current paper aims to understand this empirical puzzle by exploring whether the 'relatively sound' management of public investment can be explained by the characteristics of the central economic bureaucracy. It draws on process-tracing analysis and in-depth elite interviews. In line with the developmental state literature, the analysis argues that authoritative and insulated public administrations are essential for policy effectiveness, particularly in institutional contexts prone to a high politicisation of the public purse. Yet, in order to prevent bureaucratic capture, bureaus must also be accountable. The analysis in particular shows how increasing the transparency of the state and allowing a stronger oversight of policy performance by the public and the media are extremely important. Conversely, transformations which simply reduce the powers of strong, top-down bureaucracies to increase the indiscriminate control by governments – such as the ones which have occurred in Turkey in recent years – will not lead to stronger institutions, but merely produce different ineffective and unsustainable structures.

The importance of political local coalitions in shaping local governance structures conducive to economic growth has been a subject of research for numerous years, both in rich economies as well as in emerging countries. In spite of such amount of research, little attention has yet been paid to the political relations between the central state and the local coalitions, as well as the role of political conflicts between such levels, in hampering local and regional economic performance. Very recently scholars have argued that in countries where political factors may play a strong role in providing privileged treatment to people and constituencies with the right political affiliation, tense central/local relationships may inhibit local governance structures in promoting growth. The channels through which such impact may generate include providing particular incentives to neighboring aligned regions so as to stimulate investments' relocations, unfavorable treatment of nonaligned businesspeople via legislative and administrative mechanisms, and reducing the amount of public investments necessary for development. The current paper will exactly try to test such prediction by exploring whether tense central-local political relationships ? which will be proxied by the level to which local constituencies are politically unaligned with the government ? determined slower regional economic growth. To this aim the paper will define a model of political economic growth accounting for standard socio-economic determinants of regional economic growth, as well as political alignment variables, and test it to the 81 provinces of Turkey during the period 2004-2011. Turkey provides an interesting setting to test the research puzzle because of the highly heterogeneous regional economic trends recorded in recent years, as well as the increasing political polarization that has occurred between the opposition political parties and the government led by the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Welfare Party, AKP) since 2002. Preliminary results do indeed seem to suggest that after controlling for socio-economic factors, and for time-invariant province-specific unobservable characteristics, areas politically unaligned with the central government grew slower over the period 2004-2011. At the same time, however, the magnitude of such political impacts on regional economic performance is significantly smaller than the one of regional socio-economic factors, suggesting that politics is not a key determinant behind regional growth trends.

A growing body of theoretical contributions and empirical studies has explored how the spatial distribution of public resources and governmental transfers is likely to be driven by efficiency and equity, as well as by political considerations. This article applies this line of research to regional development policy making and explores the territorial distribution of public resources aimed at reducing interregional imbalances ? namely fixed capital investments ? in Turkey, a fast-growing, Mediterranean country currently candidate to EU accession. As early as 1963 Turkey established an ad-hoc institution and a specific policy agenda aimed at curbing the high regional disparities which, however, still dramatically persist. By adopting both Generalized Method of Moments and Fixed-Effects panel data estimators, the article first measures the extent to which socioeconomic criteria and developmental needs ? i.e. the official policy principles ? were central in the allocation of resources to Turkey?s 81 provinces over 2002-2011. If the effects of special interest politics and interest groups on policy outcomes seem to be a fact overall ubiquitous in many political systems, further efforts are needed to reconcile competing models of distributive politics. Recent research suggests that who are the beneficiaries of pork-barrelling will depend on the type of electoral system and the strength of formal political institutions. Distributive predictions for proportional representation systems with weak parties and widely spread personalised consensus building practices, such as Turkey as well as other comparable emerging countries, remain however unclear. We thus test whether political pork-barrels most benefit formalised political groups such as parties or, rather, personalised networks of representation. While following the literature, we also include additional explanatory factors, namely same-hometown loyalties. The results of the analysis uncover that political factors matter, but less than socioeconomic rationales. In fact, even after controlling for political manipulations, socioeconomic disadvantage measures remain more relevant predictors of investments. Compared to the results of research carried out on Turkey?s government grants and private investment incentives, public investments seem less prone to political manipulation. Contrary to what may be expected, however, results also suggest that it is mainly parties rather than individual legislators who benefit from redistributive games. Overall, the paper contributes to the assessment of regional development policies effectiveness in Southern current and candidate EU-Member countries, while also shedding more light on how much and who are the beneficiaries of spatial distributive games in regional development initiatives.

The paper investigates the link between organized crime and Italy's publicly funded asylum seekers' reception facilities. We gather detailed municipal-level data on the location of mafia activities and Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR)-type reception centres, and provide evidence of how the local presence of mafia increases the likelihood of hosting reception facilities. Statistical evidence and in-depth expert interviews suggest that organized crime correlates with less transparent tendering procedures in the set-up of such centres, while hosting activities increase after local governments are infiltrated by mafias. Overall, results underscore the importance of measures aimed at contrasting organized crime, especially at times of 'crises' when public policy is subject to 'states of exception'.

The paper investigates the link between organized crime and Italy's publicly-funded asylum seekers' reception facilities. We gather detailed municipal-level data on the location of mafia activities and SPRAR-type reception centres, and provide evidence of how the local presence of mafia increases the likelihood of hosting reception facilities. Statistical evidence and in–depth expert interviews suggest that organized crime correlates with less transparent tendering procedures in the set-up of such centres, while hosting activities increase after local governments are infiltrated by mafias. Overall, results underscore the importance of measures aimed at contrasting organised crime, especially at times of 'crises' when public policy is subject to 'states of exception'.

AbstractRelatively little research has explored whether there is a systemic urban-rural divide in the political and socioeconomic attitudes of citizens across Europe. Drawing on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we argue that there are strong and significant differences between the populations in these different settings, especially across western European countries. We suggest that this divide is a continuum, running on a gradient from inner cities to suburbs, towns and the countryside. The differences are explained by both composition and contextual effects, and underscore how a firmer appreciation of the urban-rural divide is integral to future place-based policy responses.

Relatively little research has explored whether there is a systemic urban-rural divide in the political and socioeconomic attitudes of citizens across Europe. Drawing on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we argue that there are strong and significant differences between the populations in these different settings, especially across western European countries. We suggest that this divide is a continuum, running on a gradient from inner cities to suburbs, towns and the countryside. The differences are explained by both composition and contextual effects, and underscore how a firmer appreciation of the urban-rural divide is integral to future place-based policy responses.