A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Truth and the Success of Science -- Explaining Scientific Success -- Simplistic Accounts of Success -- Dismissive Attitudes toward Explanation -- Underdetermination -- The Alleged Superfluousness of Truth in Explanation -- Excising Truth from Explanation -- Surrogates for Truth -- The Metaphysical Import of Truth -- 2 Conceptions of Novelty -- The History of the Independence Requirement -- Temporal Constraints -- Bayesian Confirmation -- Contemporary Analyses of Independence -- Constraints on the Analysis of Novelty -- 3 An Analysis of Novelty -- Overview and Motivation -- Assumptions and Terminology -- Conditions for Novelty -- 4 Applications -- Fresnel's Theory of Diffraction -- Special Relativity -- The Expansion of the Universe -- The Big Bang -- 5 Realism and Novelty -- The Burden of Argument -- Minimal Epistemic Realism -- The Explanatory Poverty of Instrumentalism -- In Defense of Abduction -- Novel Prediction versus Retroactive Explanation -- Partial Truth and Success -- The Pragmatics of Partial Truth -- 6 Counterarguments -- Overview -- The Skeptical Historical Induction -- Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination -- Is There Truth in Virtue? -- NOA's Bark Is as Terse as It's Trite -- 7 The Future of Realism -- Limits to Testability in Fundamental Physics -- Methodological Practice -- Warranting Methodological Change -- A Measured Retreat -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
