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A monopolist in a simple two‐period model knows that a price cap will be imposed on a Laspeyres index of the firm's prices in the second period. (Tariff basket regulation is relevant to some UK utilities.) A simple example is developed to study the welfare changes that result from strategic weight manipulation by the firm as a consequence of its ability to adjust first‐period revenue shares and interperiod price relatives. Uniform regulation requiring an equal percentage reduction in all of the regulated firm's prices provides a natural standard for comparison. One particular configuration of parameters induces identical pricing and welfare under the two forms of regulation in the example. Otherwise, compared with uniform regulation in the example, Laspeyres index regulation raises producer welfare but reduces consumer welfare in the first period and may also reduce consumer welfare in the second period. A numerical illustration shows that total welfare may also be lower under Laspeyres regulation.

ABSTRACTA single product monopolist with constant unit costs, in a simple two‐period model, is aware that price regulation will be imposed in the second period. The form of the regulation is such that price in period 2 may not exceed 100 &#x004c;̄; per cent of price in period 1, where 0 < &#x004c;̄ < 1. The period 1 price will be set higher than it would be in the absence of anticipated regulation. However, it is not always the case that pre‐regulation price will be raised as &#x004c;̄ falls. The welfare effects are crucially dependent on the form of the demand function. Under constant elasticity of demand a reduction in &#x004c;̄ will reduce both consumers' and the producer's welfare. Under linear demand, consumers benefit and the producer loses as &#x004c;̄ is reduced and the resultant effect on aggregate welfare is ambiguous.

ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to determine whether, under bilateral monopoly, profit rate regulation induces an input price bias in addition to the well known Averch‐Johnson capital intensity bias. Using a Nash‐type employer‐union, fixed bargaining power model, it is found that regulation may induce lower as well as higher wage rates. Similarly, when the two parties are respectively capital equipment supplier and user, regulation of the user's profit rate has an ambiguous effect on the equipment rental rate. In both cases the input price effect is shown to depend on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how demand elasticity varies with output.

There is now a considerable literature on the Illyrian firm (that is, the firm which is assumed to maximise income per worker), and it has been argued that the analysis may have relevance for the labour‐managed or co‐operative enterprise. Significant contributions to this literature have been made by Domar (1966), Vanek (1970), Meade (1972, 1974) and others but the seminal paper is generally recognised to be that of Ward (1958).

AbstractThis article examines the correlation between union activism, crime, and violence in the shipping industry in wartime China. Drawing on diplomatic and police records, shipping manifests, periodicals, and newspapers, the article deals with self-employed unskilled steamship attendants called "teaboys." With insight into Chinese civilians' underground struggle, the article contends that, steamship teaboys sustained their livelihoods during World War II by operating as everyday low-level spies for rival regimes. As workers, steamship teaboys pragmatically, without evidence of politico-ideological considerations, accommodated the needs of different belligerents in exchange for their own survival. Moreover, this article argues that the drastic socio-political upheaval in wartime China made these marginally employed shipboard attendants increasingly inclined towards a utilitarian patron-client relationship, originally forged in the mid-1920s when unionization began, and continued at the expense of their native-place ties and fictive family bonds. Impacted by the patron-client relationship in a climate where workers' interests were protected by the armed forces of various regimes, the teaboys viewed unions as competitive sellers of muscle power in a market for crime and violence in industrial unrest.

This study deals with the law of criminal complicity in both its commonlaw dimensions and as modified by legislation in England, in the Australianjurisdictions (i.e ., the Australian States and in the Commonwealth CrimesAct,19H), and in New Zealand.In the criminal law "complicity" denotes partnership in crime. As such,what might be called the doctrine of criminal complicity consists in thatcorpus of principle which governs the joint implication of each of two or morepersons in a given crime. A person my become particeps criminis in one oftwo ways,i.e., by physically perpetrating this crime or by instigating,encouraging the perpetrator to do this. The first offender is usually calleda principal in the crime , and the latter of them an accessory, or secondaryparty in its commission.For the reasons noted at the outset of Chapter One, the major stress inthis study is upon the statement and evaluation of the law relating tocriminal participation as an accessory. Nonetheless, it will of course befrequently necessary to consider the position of the principal in some detailin analysing the law of complicity.This analysis was motivated ay two ambitions, both of them traditional.The first of them was to state the law as it presently stands. This was feltto be justified, in particular, given that prior to this one (which waspublished in an earlier, and somewhat different form by the Law Book Co. Ltd.of Sydney, in July of last year), no monograph-length study had been undertakenof this topic in any of the common law jurisdictions.The seoond objective, one obviously dependent upon the fulfilment of thefirst, was to evaluate the effectiveness of this branch of the law and todetermine whether or not it is in need of legislative reform in each of thesubject jurisdictions, and if so, then in what terms. I have concluded, (1) that the law should continue to recognise a specifically derivative form of accessorial liability (derivative, in the sense that the person who instigates, encourages or assists the principal offender to commit a crime is made liable for this crime,rather than for an independent offence of an ancillary character); and (2) that the law of complicity - and in particular, that part of it dealing with accessorial liability - is susceptible to reform at a number of levels, in each of the subject jurisdictions. I have sought to take account of the law as it stood in the subject jurisdictions in the last months of 1980.