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Do scientists advising government in scientific advisory committees (SACs) in the UK fit the traditional model of offering substantive scientific advice to improve the quality of policy making, are they forums for policy making and negotiation where 'the science' is tempered by broader political concerns, or are they simply bodies that legitimise policies already decided upon? The traditional 'on tap' model and its alternatives imply differences in how the agendas of SACs are put together, how committees deliberate and how they influence policy, and these implied differences are explored on the basis of a 2015 survey covering the experiences and attitudes of 338 members from 46 scientific committees. The traditional model holds up rather well against models that see SACs filling broader political roles such as policy deliberation and legitimation. The findings suggest that the organization and procedures of SACs indeed allow scientists to offer advice largely without having to engage with or anticipate wider policy considerations and constraints, and that government 'steering' or otherwise leading SAC deliberations toward politically desired conclusions is rare.

Do governments lean on researchers who evaluate their policies to try to get them to produce politically useful results? Do researchers buckle under such pressure? This article, based on a survey of 205 academics who have recently completed commissioned research for government, looks at the degree to which British government departments seek to produce research that is designed to provide 'political ammunition', above all making them 'look good' or minimizing criticism of their policies. Looking at different stages in the research process – from deciding which policies to evaluate, shaping the nature and conduct of inquiry, and writing the results – the article finds evidence of government sponsors making significant efforts to produce politically congenial results. For the most part, researchers appear to resist these efforts, though the evidence base (researchers' own accounts of their work) suggests that this conclusion be treated with some caution.

While the position of special advisers (SpAds) in British government has become routinised, above all since 1997, we still know little about how they affect everyday life at the top of Whitehall departments. This paper, based on the first ever survey of SpAds, explores what they do and how they interact with policy-makers. SpAds fill a mix of 'commissar' and 'fixer' roles, and there is no evidence of a sharp division of labour between different types of SpAds. The commissar role they fill might be expected to bring SpAds into conflict with civil servants, yet there is surprisingly little evidence of conflict or rivalry. A variety of features of the special adviser's job appear to create incentives among both SpAds and civil servants to avoid conflict with each other. Since the influence of SpAds appears to depend on their relationship with the minister, claims that SpAds are a new, powerful group that shapes policy, are likely to be highly misleading. Adapted from the source document.

Set-piece consultations, through which government invites groups and individuals to comment on proposed legislation, codes of practice, guidance or some other measures, are a common feature of British policy-making, yet we know remarkably little about them. Above all, we do not know why anyone should respond to them when the chances of changing policy appear remote. This research note reports a survey of over 300 individuals in organisations that responded to government consultation requests and explores a range of hypotheses seeking to explain participation in set-piece consultations, including those relating to the role of membership, the "outsider" status of the organisation and the role of the set-piece consultation in wider lobbying campaigns. The evidence suggests that set-piece consultations are more fruitfully viewed as distinctive forms of consultation in which respondents believe they have a chance of shaping some kinds of issues but not the policy itself. Adapted from the source document.

Set-piece consultations, through which government invites groups and individuals to comment on proposed legislation, codes of practice, guidance or some other measures, are a common feature of British policy-making, yet we know remarkably little about them. Above all, we do not know why anyone should respond to them when the chances of changing policy appear remote. This research note reports a survey of over 300 individuals in organisations that responded to government consultation requests and explores a range of hypotheses seeking to explain participation in set-piece consultations, including those relating to the role of membership, the 'outsider' status of the organisation and the role of the set-piece consultation in wider lobbying campaigns. The evidence suggests that set-piece consultations are more fruitfully viewed as distinctive forms of consultation in which respondents believe they have a chance of shaping some kinds of issues but not the policy itself.

The investigation into what attracts lawyers to local government service is argued to be an important study for understanding the motivations of lawyers that will ultimately shape government service, & adding to the understanding of their motives is asserted to help create incentives to continue to attract them. Analysis of questionnaire survey data indicates that the type of legal issues they deal with, & the convenient working hours are important to job satisfaction, but low pay was cited as a disadvantage. Measuring the caliber of lawyers working in local government was not attempted, but the author asserts that this is not where lawyers turn to when they cannot make a career elsewhere, leading to the conclusion that local government attracts the wrong kind of person due to low pay. J. Harwell