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Morocco and Tunisia resisted for some time pressure from the European Union to sign readmission agreements. These agreements co-opt states into the EU's migration governance, and include a commitment to cooperation on the expulsion of unwanted migrants in Europe. Their recent acceptance of a largely unbalanced arrangement on the issue, the Mobility Partnership, came at a crucial time in the political history of these two countries. This paper shows that the EU exploited the extremely fragile and uncertain political context after the start of the uprisings, in order to push Morocco and Tunisia to sign up to the Mobility Partnership. What is more, the EU anchored the pursuit of what is a clear EU priority in a normative discourse, effectively linking cooperation on migration to EU support for democratisation in the 'neighbourhood', after the Arab upheavals. The article thus highlights a concrete case in which the EU engaged in realpolitik, using norms and values strategically. However, the normative framing of EU policies also contributed to the construction of an (allegedly) normative EU identity. Hence, the article challenges simplistic notions of 'normative power Europe'. ; Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto.

On July 25, 2013 the drafting of a new constitution by the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly reached a complete impasse, following the assassination of opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi that very day. Fears mounted that the fragile democratization process would come to a halt. In 2011, free and fair elections had brought the Islamist democratic party Ennahda to power, which had formed a government with two smaller opposition parties. Simultaneously, other "old" opposition forces underwent internal reforms and strengthened their position in the new political landscape. Instead of building strong coalitions, these "old" forces re-activated old struggles and disputes. Only in July 2013, during the critical moment, did the political forces realize that they needed to enter into negotiations and dialogue with each other to save the country. The so-called Quartet was formed, which managed to convince most parties represented in the National Constitutional Assembly to accept their road map and enter into negotiations focusing on three main issues: governmental, constitutional and electoral. The National Dialogue did not unfold as a well-planned process with a thought-through design, but rather was a response to an acute political crisis. Hence, the Tunisian National Dialogue served as an instrument for crisis management, implemented while the crisis was still unfolding. The Tunisian National Dialogue was an ad hoc process, with many actors engaged on different levels and several parts of the process taking place at the same time.