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We analyze the effect of European Union (EU) membership on financial dollarization for the Central and Eastern European countries. Using a unique monthly dataset that spans about two decades, we find that both the accession process toward EU membership and EU entry have a direct impact on deposit and loan dollarization. EU membership reduces deposit dollarization while it increases loan dollarization. The negative effect on deposit dollarization captures the increased confidence of the private sector in the domestic currency as they consider the EU admission process to reflect their government's commitment in promoting policies of long-run currency stability. The positive impact on credit dollarization is the outcome of a greater convergence of exchange rates to the euro and the subsequent anticipation for a lower currency risk, which diminishes the cost of foreign currency borrowing.

This paper examines the effect of humanitarian aid on fertility and economic growth. In an overlapping generations model, where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood, adult agents allocate their time to work, leisure and childrearing activities. Humanitarian aid influences the probability of survival to adulthood, health in childhood, and the time that adults allocate to childrearing, giving rise to an ambiguous effect on both fertility and growth. An empirical investigation for the period 1973–2007 suggests that humanitarian aid has on average a zero effect on the rates of fertility and of per capita output growth.

We analyze the effect of European Union (EU) membership on financial dollarization for the Central and Eastern European countries. Using a unique monthly dataset that spans about two decades, we find that both the accession process toward EU membership and EU entry have a direct impact on deposit and loan dollarization. EU membership reduces deposit dollarization while it increases loan dollarization. The negative effect on deposit dollarization captures the increased confidence of the private sector in the domestic currency as they consider the EU admission process to reflect their government's commitment in promoting policies of long-run currency stability. The positive impact on credit dollarization is the outcome of a greater convergence of exchange rates to the euro and the subsequent anticipation for a lower currency risk, which diminishes the cost of foreign currency borrowing.

This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots that go all the way back to their colonial experience. We substantiate our thesis with empirical evidence where the degree of European settlement during colonial times is a powerful explanatory factor of present‐day corruption. Interestingly, our mechanism is different from the prevailing view in the literature on institutions and growth, where European settlement has only positive effects. We argue that European settlement leads to higher levels of corruption for all countries where Europeans remained a minority in the population, i.e. for all developing countries.

We analyse, both theoretically and empirically, the growth effects associated with two components of volatile foreign financial assistance: 'directly productive' (or 'tied') aid and 'pure' aid. We find that scenarios in which aid can hurt the recipient's growth rate emerge only in cases where foreign aid is volatile. As a result, we conclude that it is only in conjunction with the presence of aid variability that aid allocation determines whether foreign aid hurts or promotes long-run growth. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]