Kutatásomban médiaelemzés és a magyar színházi szféra elitjének tagjaival készített interjúk alapján vizsgálom az elit cserélődési folyamatait és a színházi mező változásait 2006 és 2016 között. A mezőben az elmúlt tíz évben a kulturális pozíciók és erőforrások újraosztása, és ezzel összefüggésben egy új, több intézményen és csatornán keresztülfolyó, politikailag motivált elitépítés zajlott, mely a mező destabilizálódását okozta. A krízist a politikai változások exogén sokkja és az inkumbens elit belső kihívóinak igénye és intézményes megszerveződése tette lehetővé. A talán leglátványosabb folyamat a mezőben a pozicionális elit cseréje volt, mely a színházigazgatói kinevezési gyakorlat segítségével zajlott. Ám amíg a pozicionális és adminisztratív elit technikailag könnyebben lecserélhető, a szakmai reputáció felépítése a kulturális mezőt alkotó mechanizmusok sajátosságai miatt nehezebben kivitelezhető, így a reputációs elit összetétele, valamint a reputációt termelő intézmények struktúrája keveset változott. A színházi szféra összefoglalva egy olyan kulturális mező, melybe az intézményi sajátosságok miatt meglehetősen könnyű beavatkozni, lényegi változásokat viszont már sokkal nehezebb elérni. A mező megszokott belső mechanizmusai a részleges elitcsere ellenére a mélyben tovább működnek.
In social sciences literature, numerous attempts have been made to capture the political essence and features of Hungary's 'illiberal' regime but few were aimed at analyzing specific public policy fields in the illiberal democracy. This paper analyses the cultural policy of the Orbán regime, focusing on the role of ideology. A qualitative case study based on document analysis looks at the legitimizing function of post-communist traditionalism in a managed illiberal democracy (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). Governmental policy making in the field of culture is analyzed on two interrelated levels: (1) attempts to rewrite the cultural canon, and (2) institutional and financial changes. The results show that post-communist traditionalism serves as a discursive framework for the partial replacement of the cultural elite as well as the redistribution of cultural positions and resources, thus contributing to the creation of a new, loyal elite for the managed illiberal political system.
This article examines social continuity and discontinuity in the Hungarian political, economic and cultural elites between 1988 and 2009. In these two decades, four empirical surveys (five among the economic elite) have been carried out at the Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to explore the composition, recruitment, lifestyle, and attitudes of different elite groups. This large amount of data (4773 persons, in total) allows us to follow long term trends not yet analyzed and distinguish between several types of social processes in the Hungarian elite. The analysis complements but also augments some of the main findings of the earlier literature an elite circulation and reproduction under post-communism.
"This article examines social continuity and discontinuity in the Hungarian political, economic and cultural elites between 1988 and 2009. In these two decades, four empirical surveys (five among the economic elite) have been carried out at the Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to explore the composition, recruitment, lifestyle, and attitudes of different elite groups. This large amount of data (4773 persons, in total) allows us to follow long term trends not yet analyzed and distinguish between several types of social processes in the Hungarian elite. The analysis complements but also augments some of the main findings of the earlier literature an elite circulation and reproduction under post-communism." (author's abstract)
The topic of the paper is the relationship between social stratification based on occupational classes and the mechanisms of social integration, which was analysed on quantitative data collected in 2015, 2018 and 2021. We sought answers to how we can better understand the interaction of social and integration positions, as well as the functioning of complex integration mechanisms. In the examined six years, a definite homogenization took place in the integration indicators of the occupational groups: this means that indicators measured of occupational group in some integration dimensions took on closer values. It is also part of our research results that there is an interpretable correlation between the hierarchy of occupational groups and the examined integration mechanisms: political participation, number of weak ties, subjective social exclusion and acceptance of norm violation. The upper strata of the occupational class model (mostly entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and other white-collar workers) have consistently reported higher numbers of weak ties, lower sense of exclusion and higher political participation. We also found consistent, yet opposite results in the lower strata, mostly among the unemployed and those with unskilled and semi-skilled work linked to lower qualifications. The strengthening of homogenization and the impact of the hierarchy of occupational groups are simultaneous integrational characteristics of Hungarian society. The future research question is whether homogenization rearranges the integration effect of the occupational hierarchy.