Search results

This paper examines the relationship between US aid and human rights violations in autocracies. It argues that autocratic leaders do not want to lose aid owing to their poor human rights records, and yet at the same time, cannot completely stop their rights violations because they often come into power through force. In this situation, the leader acts strategically by substituting the visible rights violations for invisible ones. However, substitution depends on the strategic relationship between the US and the recipient. If the recipient is strategically unimportant, then we can expect substitution; otherwise, it will not be necessary.

This paper examines the relationship between US aid and human rights violations in autocracies. It argues that autocratic leaders do not want to lose aid owing to their poor human rights records, and yet at the same time, cannot completely stop their rights violations because they often come into power through force. In this situation, the leader acts strategically by substituting the visible rights violations for invisible ones. However, substitution depends on the strategic relationship between the US and the recipient. If the recipient is strategically unimportant, then we can expect substitution; otherwise, it will not be necessary.

Civil-military relations and terrorism are both extensively studied subjects. Their relationship has, however, yet to be examined. We maintain that public conflict between the civilian and the military leadership in a country and declining civil control over the armed forces may often precipitate a rise in domestic terror events. Civil-military conflict and reduced civilian control can lead to agency slack by the armed forces and ineffective counterterror policies. These phenomena are also associated with policies that exclude groups in society and generate grievances, leading some to turn to terror. In zero inflated negative binomial analyses of domestic terror events and two distinct indicators of civil-military tension, we find support for our contention. Terror incidents increase both when civil-military conflict rises and when civilian control decreases. Our results add to understanding of both the domestic consequences of civil-military tension and the types of influences that impact domestic terror.

How do economic sanctions affect civil–military relations in targeted states? Though much research has focused on how external military threats affect civil–military relations, no study to date has offered a thorough assessment of the degree to which non-military threats, particularly sanctions, alter civil–military dynamics. We posit that sanctions alter civil–military bargaining in ways that increase the military's role in political decision-making, ultimately lessening civilian control. However, we also posit that targeted regime leaders want to fulfill as many of the military's demands as possible with their restricted pot of resources, ultimately leading to sanctions' limited role in observed coup attempts. We substantiate our theoretical claims using time-series, cross-national data on economic sanctions, civilian control, and coup attempts.

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.