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Electoral systems are assumed to enhance political efficacy and encourage participation through party mobilisation because they create incentives for parties (or candidates) to mobilise voters. This paper makes use of survey data collected after elections in more than 30 countries, spanning a variety of party systems in both established and new democracies, to examine how party mobilisation varies across context and what difference it makes. The results demonstrate that political efficacy and behaviour are enhanced when parties mobilise voters. This is most likely to occur in systems where parties compete in a narrow issue space. In contrast, citizens are less likely to come into contact with parties in polarised systems. This has consequences for both political attitudes and engagement.

Electoral systems are assumed to enhance political efficacy and encourage participation through party mobilisation because they create incentives for parties (or candidates) to mobilise voters. This paper makes use of survey data collected after elections in more than 30 countries, spanning a variety of party systems in both established and new democracies, to examine how party mobilisation varies across context and what difference it makes. The results demonstrate that political efficacy and behaviour are enhanced when parties mobilise voters. This is most likely to occur in systems where parties compete in a narrow issue space. In contrast, citizens are less likely to come into contact with parties in polarised systems. This has consequences for both political attitudes and engagement.

Although mixed member proportional (MMP) systems offer several advantages they also have one potential problem that threatens the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Some suggest that these systems suffer from a 'contamination effect' where candidates have the potential to influence the party list vote which ultimately determines the partisan composition of parliament. This paper examines this theory in New Zealand which has conducted four elections under MMP. The analysis is based on district level data merged with individual level data. The findings suggest that although many voters do not have an opinion of candidates, those who do are likely to evaluate incumbents and party leaders more positively. While these factors can also have an influence on the party list vote, the overall effect is quite limited. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral systems are considered by some to be "the best of both worlds" because they combine single member district representation with proportional outcomes. Critics, however, maintain that such systems cause voter confusion leading some voters to cast misinformed votes. Survey data from Germany & New Zealand are used to investigate voter's political knowledge of the electoral system & their voting behavior. The findings suggest that knowledge about the electoral system is similar in New Zealand & in Germany. Although some may very well find the system complex, there is no evidence to suggest that a lack of knowledge about the electoral system influences voting behavior. The results undermine the claims made by skeptics who fear that misunderstanding threatens the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

Tests four explanations for willingness to impose term limitations on members of Congress and on state legislators; based on 1992 public opinion surveys; US. Explanations are dissatisfaction with legislative performance, dissatisfaction with the political process, self-interest, and ideology.

AbstractFeatures of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the 'satisfaction with democracy' item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.