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In the next ten years, who will win and who will lose from
globalization? In thinking about this question, I avoid speculating on the
broad impact of globalization on economic outcomes. Instead, I limit my
treatment to the impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) on developed
and developing countries, especially how competition to attract firms
affects domestic politics and national economies.

A contribution to a symposium,"Ten Years from Now," addresses the potential impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) on developed & developing countries, especially how competition to attract MNCs affects national economies & domestic politics. Research has shown that the impact of increased competition to attract multinationals has been limited by domestic policies & institutions. The benefits of foreign direct investment are somewhat nebulous & may be conditional on host economic conditions. The countries most likely to reap the rewards of MNCs will be those that are able to manage the distribution of costs. The effect of competition for capital on governance & the relationship between corporate tax rates & foreign direct investment are explored to suggest that policies that encourage a favorable business environment for domestic firms also attract foreign direct investment & countries that maintain higher levels of corporate tax rates are the most likely to be successful in the coming decade. Contrary to the gloomy assessments of many, it is argued that globalization has enhanced the role & importance of the nation-state. 34 References. J. Lindroth

AbstractThe inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in transition economies are affected by political factors. This paper examines the empirical effects of two factors: (i) the level of economic reform; and (ii) the level of 'capture' of the state by political and economic elites, on the level of FDI inflows using both OLS and Tobit models for 18 countries from 1993–97. Both of these factors have large and statistically significant effects on FDI inflows. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Radar is a fundamental technology in today's military and civilian environment, and continuing development of this technology is of utmost importance to maintaining technological advantages this realm. Current radar technologies suffer from jamming and clutter limitations. STAP is a statistical method to remove this noise, however it is extremely computationally intensive, and presents several real time processing hurdles. Clutter Classification is another method to classify the radar returns that are found according to the best fit statistical distribution that the return follows. This research investigation attempts to use this clutter classification technology to aid in the detection of targets by filtering the radar returns and then passing only the target rich data the computationally complex STAP application. This research effort also attempts to optimize the STAP application through this integration to provide real time STAP radar processing power to current platforms with minimal hardware requirements.

What makes a country attractive to foreign investors? To what extent do conditions of governance and politics matter? This book provides the most systematic exploration to date of these crucial questions at the nexus of politics and economics. Using quantitative data and interviews with investment promotion agencies, investment location consultants, political risk insurers, and decision makers at multinational corporations, Nathan Jensen arrives at a surprising conclusion: Countries may be competing for international capital, but government fiscal policy--both taxation and spending--has little impact on multinationals' investment decisions. Although government policy has a limited ability to determine patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, political institutions are central to explaining why some countries are more successful in attracting international capital. First, democratic institutions lower political risks for multinational corporations. Indeed, they lead to massive amounts of foreign direct investment. Second, politically federal institutions, in contrast to fiscally federal institutions, lower political risks for multinationals and allow host countries to attract higher levels of FDI inflows. Third, the International Monetary Fund, often cited as a catalyst for promoting foreign investment, actually deters multinationals from investment in countries under IMF programs. Even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements are associated with much lower levels of FDI inflows.

Economic development incentives target individual firms for financial or non-financial benefits to induce capital investment or job creation. Previous studies have found a mixed impact of incentives on economic development, with numerous studies pointing to no impact of incentives on economic growth or job creation. I add to this literature by analyzing two different state economic development incentive programs using the same methods and time-period, allowing for direct comparability. My analysis is the first, "pre-registered" study of incentives, where all of the data collection, design and methodological decisions were made and documented prior to receiving the data. Using a pre-registered matching method design, I estimate the impact of Maryland and Virginia's flagship economic development incentives on job creation. My main finding is that these incentive programs had essentially zero impact on job creation when they are compared to a control group of similar firms. My secondary results find that even after removing firms from the analysis that were subject to "clawbacks" based on non-compliance with the incentive agreement do not improve the overall performance of the program.