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This paper presents an analysis of the main theories and results of experimental research in the context of the shifting social preferences towards moral prejudices in a process of resource allocation decision making. Researchers of game theory have found that three motives are included in the decision-making process about resource allocation: social preferences, moral prejudices, and self-interest. Personal interests and moral prejudices are strong predictors in the model of predicting people's social orientations. Moral prejudices, being the distortions created by self-interest, can strongly influence people's social preferences, and even change them to the opposite. As a result, an asymmetric relationship is established between personal interest and moral prejudices in the decision-making process about resource allocation. When moral prejudices become an obstacle to achieving a goal, a person unconsciously distorts the information so that it justifies its actions. These distortions can be manifested in the avoidance of information that interferes with personal interests, the selective selection of information, and even recourse to opposing moral principles. In the long run, all this is expressed in the change of a person's social orientation from altruistic to selfish. These changes in people's social preferences are confirmed by the results of numerous experiments not only in social psychology, but also in social neuropsychology and neuroeconomics. The way to overcome these distortions is to have a clear understanding of the limits of personal interests and an understanding of one's own motives in decisions about resource allocation.

The article presents an analysis of the main methodological principles and schemes of social preferences experimental research, which are determined as a fundamental concept to understanding the behavior of decision-makers in the process of resolving social dilemmas. The models presented in the article include an analysis of the factors that determine social preferences. Among them are the factors of trust, reliability, reciprocity, rejection of inequality, unconditional altruism and competitive advantage. The article provides a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the classic methods for studying social preferences, which usually take the form of ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game and public goods game. The study reveals the importance of the Nash equilibrium as a way to interpret human behavior in resource allocation during the game. Analysis of numerous literary sources shows that the ultimatum game is a classic scheme for studying the altruistic behavior of people. The submission of a proposal and its acceptance is an example of Nash's ideal equilibrium. Deviation from this balance can be interpreted as altruism. In turn, the trust game is a classic scheme for studying the reciprocity and prosocial orientation. If the behavior of players deviates from Nash's equilibrium, it is interpreted as being caused by trust and reciprocity. The dictator game is a classic scheme for studying the rejection of inequality. The subject's behavior can be interpreted as a rejection of inequality or altruism, but not as a rejection of risk, as the offer of Player 1 is mandatory for Player 2. Public goods game is a classic scheme for studying the competitive orientation. Nash's ideal balance in this form of play is to do nothing for public consumption, but deviating from this rule is interpreted as altruistic behavior that is the opposite of competitive orientation. As a result, the design of psychological research is presented, which most accurately typologies the social preferences of the subjects and can contribute to the creation of a representative model of decision-making process.