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AbstractThis article examines the political determinants of the variations in active labour market policies across advanced democracies. Specifically, it investigates the conditions under which a welfare state accommodates rather than disregards the interests of labour market outsiders. Relying on the literature on post-industrial electoral realignment, this article argues that ideological orientations not only in socio-economic but also in sociocultural dimensions dictate the policy preferences of political parties for labour market programmes. This study then hypothesizes that libertarian governments are more likely than authoritarian governments to support human capital formation of labour market outsiders. An analysis of cabinet-based periodization data of 21 advanced industrialized countries from 1985 to 2017 shows that left- and right-libertarian governments favour public spending on active labour market programmes, thereby supporting this study's hypothesis. Furthermore, it also reveals that while left-libertarian governments increase expenditures for direct job creation schemes, right-libertarian ones do so for employment assistance and training programmes.

Childcare policy has become an integral part of social and economic policy in post-industrial democracies. This article explores how the transformation of party systems structures the politics of childcare policy. It reveals that political parties contend with each other over childcare and female employment policy on the social-value dimension as well as the redistributive dimension. Assuming that different party policies have distinct impacts on public childcare policy, it is hypothesised in this article that a government's policy position -- composed of the governing parties' policy positions -- affects changes in public spending for childcare services. Through an analysis of the pooled time-series and cross-section data of 18 advanced industrialised countries from 1980 until 2005 using multivariate regression methods, it is revealed that a government's redistributive left-right policy position interacts with its social liberal-conservative policy position, and that a left-liberal government raises its budget for childcare services while a left-conservative government does not. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractChildcare policy has become an integral part of social and economic policy in post‐industrial democracies. This article explores how the transformation of party systems structures the politics of childcare policy. It reveals that political parties contend with each other over childcare and female employment policy on the social‐value dimension as well as the redistributive dimension. Assuming that different party policies have distinct impacts on public childcare policy, it is hypothesised in this article that a government's policy position – composed of the governing parties' policy positions – affects changes in public spending for childcare services. Through an analysis of the pooled time‐series and cross‐section data of 18 advanced industrialised countries from 1980 until 2005 using multivariate regression methods, it is revealed that a government's redistributive left–right policy position interacts with its social liberal–conservative policy position, and that a left–liberal government raises its budget for childcare services while a left–conservative government does not.

AbstractDespite there being common socio‐demographic pressures across advanced industrialized countries, the public elder care programmes therein tend to vary. While the current literature on social care devotes itself to describing the care arrangements of each country and pigeonholing welfare/gender regime types, it does not sufficiently address this empirical puzzle. This study looks to specify the causal relationship between political institutions and public long‐term care programmes. It argues that countries with personal‐vote‐oriented electoral systems and/or fragmented party systems have difficulties in developing universalistic public elder care programmes, whereas countries with party‐vote‐oriented electoral systems and cohesive party systems are likely to develop generous elder care programmes. For whilst the former types of political institutions prioritize patronage‐based, particularistic benefits, the latter types encourage political actors to appeal to broader constituencies through universalistic welfare programmes. This study tests this claim by examining pooled time‐series and cross‐section data of advanced democracies, from 1980 until 2001. The empirical results suggest that politicians' reliance on personal votes and the fragmentation of ruling coalitions impede the expansion of public spending for elder care.

This study examines the conditions under which welfare states are likely to adapt their social policies to the transformation of social risk structures under post-industrialization. It argues that in the era of welfare retrenchment, while heterogeneous policy preferences among veto players impede the expansion of new social risk policies, the same institutional characteristics encourage the growth of old social risk policies. This study analyzes the time-series and cross-section data of advanced industrialized democracies from 1980 to 2001 with a fixedeffect model, and reveals that the composition of veto players structures the state's ability to adjust its social policies to post-industrialization.

Based on an ideational approach, a burgeoning body of literature has directly measured populist attitudes among supporters of populist parties. However, few empirical works have examined whether these attitudes among voters also explain their preferences for politicians whom a political-strategic approach regards as populists. In addition, no research has verified the applicability of individual populist scales to non-Western countries. To overcome these shortcomings, this study assesses populist attitudes among Japanese citizens and explores whether a respondent with these attitudes tends to vote for populist politicians in Japan. We conducted an online survey after the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election. Survey results revealed that the supporters of the Tokyoites First Party – a typical populist party in a political-strategic sense – lack the quintessential elements of populism. Further, several subcomponents of populist attitudes led to support for the Japanese Communist Party – a radical leftist party.

Seiji riron to jisshō kenkyū o tsunagu wa : keikenteki bunseki niokeru gainen bunseki no yakuwari / 稗田健志 [著] -- Kansatsu kanōna mono to kansatsu fukanōna mono : kihan keiken no kubetsu no saikentō / 田村哲樹 [著] -- Tasha eno shien o dōkizukeru dōjō to awaremi : sābei jikken niyoru dōtokuteki chokkan no kenshō / 河野勝 三村憲弘 [著] -- "ippyō no kakusa" o meguru kihan riron to jisshō bunseki : nihon deno giron wa nani ga mondai nanoka? / 粕谷祐子 [著] -- Seisaku adobokashī niokeru seiji riron to jisshō bunseki no kyōgō to kyōdō : toshi to mobiriti o meguru shomondai o jirei toshite / 井上弘貴 [著] -- Kokusai kankei kenkyū no shōrai : kokusai kankei no kenkyū kara gurōbaru kankei no kenkyū e / 芝崎厚士 [著] -- Shakai jikken to ribatarian patānarizumu wa sekai no hinkon o sukū? : enjo no shinchōryū ni kansuru seiji rironteki ichikōsatsu / 木山幸輔 [著] -- Soreyue komon'uerusu e shintai o sasageta : arufureddo jimān "girisha no kyōwakoku" to teikoku kyōwa shugi / 馬路智仁 [著] -- 1980nendai ikō no iryō kyōkyū seido kaikaku no tenkai : seisaku gakushūron no shiza kara / 竜聖人 [著] -- 2013nen doitsu renpō gikai senkyo no bunseki to renpō seiji eno gan'i / 中川洋一 [著] -- Chūō chihō kankei niokeru seitō rūto no yakuwari : zaisei iten kaikaku no nihon kanada hikaku / 城戸英樹 [著] -- Chihō gikai senkyo no tokuhyō bunseki : giin kōdō to senkyo tono tsunagari / 築山宏樹 [著]