Building Downstream Capacity for Critical Minerals in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities
In: Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. 22-16
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In: Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. 22-16
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In: Journal of global security studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 110-114
ISSN: 2057-3189
AbstractIn the field of global security studies, inclusion, both in terms of process and outcomes, is certainly having a moment. Like many terms widely adopted by the international security and development communities, the utility of the discourse around inclusion stems in part from its ambiguity. The various contributions to this special issue make good and productive use of this ambiguity and have moved the discussion of inclusive approaches to governance, violence reduction, and peace-building forward. In doing so, however, they have put forth very different conceptualizations and operationalizations of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, my contribution to this symposium identifies these various conceptualizations, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of proposed measures, and concludes with remarks on the normative implications of these analyses.
In: Journal of global security studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 2-22
ISSN: 2057-3189
Does oil hinder democracy? The prevailing wisdom holds that, since 1980, oil has hindered democracy by enabling oil wealth to flow to state-owned oil companies, breaking the fiscal contract with society, and endowing oil-rich regimes with means to invest in repression and accommodation. However, these arguments do not account for system-level factors that might affect the oil-democracy relationship. I argue that a structural break in the oil-democracy relationship occurred at the end of the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union reduced support for both oil-poor and oil-rich authoritarian regimes in the developing world. The rollback of support facilitated post–Cold War democratization of the resource-poor regimes, while oil-rich regimes were better positioned to stave off pressures to democratize. Based on a re-analysis of two prominent studies, I find the oil curse to be a post–Cold War phenomenon, with negative consequences for democracy of a magnitude roughly 80 percent larger than previously estimated. I further explore these dynamics via comparative case studies of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The evidence shows that the oil curse is a function of geopolitical dynamics, not just international market conditions.
World Affairs Online
In: Political geography: an interdisciplinary journal for all students of political studies with an interest in the geographical and spatial aspects, Volume 60, p. 251-252
ISSN: 0962-6298
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Volume 34, Issue 6, p. 575-596
ISSN: 1549-9219
Anecdotal evidence suggests that high oil prices embolden oil-rich states to behave more aggressively. This article contends that arguments linking oil-exporter status to interstate conflict are implicitly price contingent, and tests this via a reanalysis of works by Colgan and Weeks. It finds a contingent effect of oil prices on interstate disputes, with high oil prices associated with significant increases in dispute behavior in petrostates, for which oil exports constitute more than 10% of GDP, while having a null effect in non-petrostates. Directed-dyadic tests indicate that this is due to petrostates initiating disputes, rather than becoming more attractive targets for conquest or coercion.
World Affairs Online
In: Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 17-2
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Working paper
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Volume 34, Issue 6, p. 575-596
ISSN: 1549-9219
Anecdotal evidence suggests that high oil prices embolden oil-rich states to behave more aggressively. This article contends that arguments linking oil-exporter status to interstate conflict are implicitly price contingent, and tests this via a reanalysis of works by Colgan and Weeks. It finds a contingent effect of oil prices on interstate disputes, with high oil prices associated with significant increases in dispute behavior in petrostates, for which oil exports constitute more than 10% of GDP, while having a null effect in non-petrostates. Directed-dyadic tests indicate that this is due to petrostates initiating disputes, rather than becoming more attractive targets for conquest or coercion.
In: Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 14-3
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Working paper
In: Civil wars, Volume 13, Issue 4, p. 345-370
ISSN: 1743-968X
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 47, Issue 3, p. 273-285
ISSN: 1460-3578
This article identifies and addresses key conceptual and measurement issues raised by measures of state capacity in studies of civil conflict. First, it reviews competing definitions and operationalizations of state capacity, focusing specifically on those that emphasize (1) military capacity, (2) bureaucratic administrative capacity, and (3) the quality and coherence of political institutions. Second, it critically assesses these measures on the basis of construct validity, focusing attention on whether they accurately capture the theoretical concept of state capacity, and whether they allow the researcher to differentiate between competing causal mechanisms. Third, it employs principal factor analysis to identify the underlying dimensionality of 15 different operationalizations of state capacity. State capacity is characterized by low dimensionality, with three factors — or dimensions of state capacity — explaining over 90% of the variance in the 15 measures. While the first factor, rational legality, captures bureaucratic and administrative capacity, the second, rentier-autocraticness, and third, neopatrimoniality, capture aspects of state capacity that cut across theoretical categories. The article concludes by suggesting a multivariate approach to modeling state capacity, and that (1) survey measures of bureaucratic quality, and (2) tax capacity are the most theoretically and empirically justified.
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Working paper
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 47, Issue 3, p. 273-285
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Peace Research, Volume 47, Issue 3
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In: Journal of global security studies, Volume 4, Issue 3, p. 310-320
ISSN: 2057-3189
AbstractThis article investigates the factors that affect scholarly attention on particular countries in four major international relations (IR) journals: International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, International Security, and World Politics for the period 1970 to the present. The analysis supports three basic conclusions. First, the United States receives the most scholarly attention in leading IR journals by a large margin. Second, a baseline model of scholarly attention, including just population, gross domestic product (GDP), and a dummy for the United States fits the data rather well. Additional factors such as membership in prominent international organizations or involvement in armed conflicts improve model fit, but only marginally, with little evidence of regional or English-language bias. And third, there is only weak evidence that countries with stronger economic and security linkages with the United States receive more attention. However, Israel and Taiwan—two countries with unique security relationships with the United States—receive more scholarly attention than either the baseline or augmented models would predict. Our analysis of bibliometric data from leading IR journals indicates the United States is the three-hundred-thousand-pound blue whale of IR scholarship. However, this emphasis is not particularly outsized when its large population, economy, and its extensive history of participation in interstate wars are taken into account.
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 56, Issue 4, p. 469-484
ISSN: 1460-3578
Why do governments use deadly force against unarmed protesters? The government's threat perception may be a function of the mobilization potential of the opposition and/or the size of the ruling elite's support coalition. Given the high salience of ethnicity in African politics, governments that depend on small ethnic coalitions will see peaceful protests as more threatening, as the opposition may be able to draw on larger numbers of potential dissidents and excluded groups. Alternately, governments with larger, more homogeneous ethnic coalitions will find nonviolent mobilization less threatening and will be less likely to respond with deadly force. Using the Social Conflict Analysis Database, we demonstrate that as the size – and to a lesser extent homogeneity – of the ethnic ruling coalition grows, governments are significantly less likely to use deadly force against nonviolent protesters. This finding is robust to several operationalizations of the size of the government's support coalition, the inclusion of other measures of ethnic demographics, and estimators that account for the hierarchical nature of the data. Threat perception hinges not only on dissident tactics but on their demands, their mobilization potential, and their capacity to impose costs on the government. This article demonstrates that the size and composition of the government's ethnic support base matters as well.
World Affairs Online