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There are various projections concerning the emigration pressure from the accessing countries into the member states of the European Union. The arguments are based mostly on economic considerations supposing that sufficient difference between the economic strength (GDP, wages etc.) of the possible sending and receiving countries would induce considerable migration. Others argue that lessons on previous enlargement experiences of the EU can be of much relevance: the new candidate countries emigration patterns are expected to be similar - or just different - than the previous ones have been. There is not much empirical evidence on East-West labour migration. Mobility under bilateral agreements is a special frame to stimulate the desired labour migration that has gained special importance in the enlargement process of the European Union. The paper is based on empirical research of bilateral labour programmes between Hungary and the countries of the European Union. The present work has been a first attempt to set up and use empirical data to analyse Hungarian labour emigration. We confronted some theoretical considerations concerning bilateral programmes that should influence labour migration into the desired way to the receiving countries with the Hungarian experience of labour migration under the bilateral programmes. We found that programmes were effective to channel labour migration in the desired way. The structure of the labour migration under these programmes coincides, however, the general migration tendencies. Unregulated migration would, presumably, not give a considerable different character to Hungarian labour emigration.

The article analyzes the requirement recently formulated by different parties of the accession process: the candidate countries should raise their wage level close to the average of the EU even before they join the union. The authors show that wage convergence, defined this way, has no theoretical underpinnings. According to the experience of less developed EU members that joined the union in the 1970s and 1980s, the so called cohesion countries, even after accession, wage convergence is a protracted process. The Hungarian wage level is currently far behind the EU average, and it is also lower than wages in several Central and East European countries. This lagging behind is, however, one of the sources of the competitiveness of Hungarian products. The article draws up possible convergence scenarios for the Hungarian wages. It turns out that, even with a relatively fast growth of output and expansive wage policies, the convergence to the EU level will be a very long process.

The article analyzes the requirement recently formulated by different parties of the accession process: the candidate countries should raise their wage level close to the average of the EU even before they join the union. The authors show that wage convergence, defined this way, has no theoretical underpinnings. According to the experience of less developed EU members that joined the union in the 1970s and 1980s, the so called cohesion countries, even after accession, wage convergence is a protracted process. The Hungarian wage level is currently far behind the EU average, and it is also lower than wages in several Central and East European countries. This lagging behind is, however, one of the sources of the competitiveness of Hungarian products. The article draws up possible convergence scenarios for the Hungarian wages. It turns out that, even with a relatively fast growth of output and expansive wage policies, the convergence to the EU level will be a very long process.